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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
This dissertation addresses two distinct issues. Chapter 2 studies business cycles with asset
Kre sales under limited commitment in Knancial markets. Chapters 3 and 4 study Krm
entry and exit dynamics in a global game with incomplete information. Chapter 3 derives
analytical solutions when Krms’ productivity is uniformly distributed. Chapter 4 extends
the analysis to span more general distributions and solves the problem numerically.
The second chapter develops a stochastic over-lapping generations’ model to study the
intertemporal and intergenerational transmission of productivity shocks. Productivity shocks
cause Kre sales of capital, which in turn aRects the income of future generations. From a
constrained-eQciency perspective, competitive equilibria can be ineQcient as agents’ choices
in equilibrium exhibit ex-ante over-borrowing. The ineQciency arises because entrepreneurs
cannot get fully Knanced from outside funds due to limited commitment in Knancial markets.
The fact that the capital prices are determined in competitive markets also contributes to
the above ineQciency because agents fail to internalize potential ex-post Kre sales. A capital
requirement policy can reduce Kre sales when adverse productivity shocks occur, and can
thus increase the income for all future generations. On the other hand, a lower capital
stock even when good productivity shocks occur decreases income for all future generations.
Overall, this chapter shows that in the long run, a capital requirement policy can (strictly)
increase welfare of agents.
The third chapter develops a static general equilibrium model to study Krms’ entry and
exit decision in a global game with incomplete information. Firms’ choices are strategic
substitutes. This chapter analytically proves the existence and uniqueness of a monotonic
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pure strategy equilibrium when the mean productivity and the productivity conditional
on the mean are both drawn from uniform distributions. Using numerical examples, it is
shown that when the precision of public information increases, the equilibrium switching
productivity level increases and, as a result, the aggregate industry productivity increases.
By reallocating resources to more productive Krms, an increase in the precision of public
information leads to a higher welfare.
The fourth chapter extends the problem studied in the third chapter to examine whether
and how the shapes of productivity distributions aRect the existence of the monotonic pure
strategy equilibria. The mean productivity is now drawn from a truncated normal distribu-
tion and individual Krm’s productivity conditional on the mean is drawn from more general
(truncated) distributions, such as truncated normal, truncated gamma, and truncated expo-
nential distributions. With numerical examples, it is shown that a unique monotonic pure
strategy equilibrium continues to exist when Krms’ productivity is drawn from non-uniform
distributions. As in chapter 3, both the aggregate productivity and the welfare per worker
increase with the increase in the precision of public information. However, unlike in chapter
3, the impact of an increase in the precision of private information on aggregate productiv-
ity and the welfare depends on the shape of the distribution. In particular, this impact is
uncertain when the productivity conditional on the mean is drawn from truncated gamma
distribution, which is skewed.
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CHAPTER 2. BUSINESS CYCLES WITH ASSET FIRE SALES
2.1 Introduction
Over about the last two decades, the realization that credit booms are often followed by
Knancial crisis with a drop in asset prices and investments has attracted worldwide atten-
tion from policymakers as well as academic researchers (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2000, 2002), RanciËre and Tornell (2009), Schularick and Taylor (2009), and Claessens et
al (2010)). In response, a new set of “macro-prudential” regulations has been proposed that
broadly aims to reduce the occurrence and impact of crisis by addressing the problem of
“over-borrowing”. In order to assess the policy intervention, it is important to understand
why private sectors’ optimal decisions are sometimes socially ineQcient. Equally important
is to understand the intertemporal transmission of Knancial distress to an economy’s income
and wealth for future generations.
This chapter focuses on the pecuniary externality caused by Knancial frictions and com-
petitive capital markets for explaining the ineQciency in agents’ Knancial choices relative to
the socially optimal level. The key feature of the chapter’s model is that adverse productiv-
ity shocks cause Kre sales, which endogenously generates ineQcient liquidation of productive
assets and then decrease the capital used in production. By reducing future income, adverse
productivity shocks aRect the wealth of future generations.
Chapter 2 lays out a stochastic two-period overlapping-generations model of investment
and production under Knancial frictions. In each period two types of agents, the consumer
and the entrepreneur, are born. There is a single homogenous perishable consumption good
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as well as capital in the economy. Young agents work and get wage income in the Krst
period of their lives. The entrepreneur can borrow and invest either fully or partially in
a productive asset that yields state-dependent income at the end of the Krst period. The
entrepreneur oRers a state-contingent contract to the consumer to borrow and the consumer
can accept or reject the oRer. Also, for the capital to remain productive in the second period,
the entrepreneur is required to incur additional maintenance costs in the Krst period. In the
second period, both types of agents can produce consumption goods. The entrepreneur’s
second period technology includes both labor and capital and has a higher rate of return,
while consumer’s technology only involves capital and yields a lower return.
If an adverse productivity shock occurs in the Krst period of agents’ lives, due to lim-
ited commitment the entrepreneur cannot fully cover the maintenance costs through outside
funding. As a result, Kre sales take place and the capital price drops.1 Although entrepre-
neurs and consumers are fully rational optimizing agents, in a competitive equilibrium they
do not internalize the general equilibrium eRect of Kre sales of capital on their prices. This
generates a pecuniary externality in the sense that there is an initial over-investment, and in
the event of Kre sales there is a welfare loss due to the reallocation of capital from a highly
productive sector to a less productive sector. The welfare is measured by an unconditional
expected ex-ante welfare of a "representative" generation, followed by Bhattacharya and
Singh (2008). Furthermore, the bad shock is dynamically transmitted from current genera-
tion to future generations through a decline in wages, which constitute the funds available
for future generations. A capital requirement policy can restrict borrowing in the Krst pe-
riod of agents’ lives and then reduce the investment by the entrepreneur as well as ex-post
Kre sales. Thus, wealth of current generation increases by imposing the capital requirement
policy. Although the eRects of capital requirement policy on wealth of the next generation
depend on the current state, total wealth of all future generations can strictly increase by
imposing the capital requirement policy.
1Bordo and Jeanne (2002) show that a sharper reduction in investment and output can result from highly
leveraged Krms when a negative shock hits, oRering a similar Lavor to the equilibria examined in this chapter.
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Among the papers that study ineQciency of equilibria in Knancially constrained economies,
the Krst ones that focus on pecuniary externality in general equilibrium through asset prices
under Knancial distress are by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Jeanne and Korinek (2010) use collateral constraints to feature pecuniary externality in K-
nancial crises and they conclude that the source of pecuniary externality is the interaction
between debt accumulation and asset prices. Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) extend their work
to study optimal time-consistent maro-prudential policy. Both papers assume a representa-
tive Krm-household agent, and by construction there are no Kre sales within the economy.
It is through the value of collateral that asset prices work in their model. A lower value of
collateral leads to a tighter Knancial constraint. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) build
a time-to-build model with two types of collateral constraints, domestic and international,
and they Knd that Kre sales of domestic assets can occur when the international constraint
of collateral is binding in aggregate. Chapter 2 takes an alternative approach that relies on
agent heterogeneity to generate actual Kre sales in the economy and an ex-post ineQcient
reallocation of capital from a second-best perspective.2 The ineQciency comes from limited
commitment in Knancial contracts on the part of both entrepreneurs and consumers and the
fact that capital price is determined in a competitive capital market. Lorenzoni (2008) stud-
ies this externality in a static 3-period stochastic model, while the present chapter focuses on
the eRects of externality in a dynamic model through intertemporal transmission of produc-
tivity shocks. Restricting borrowing in current period not only changes the wealth for current
generation but also aRects wealth for all future generations. Thus, a non state-contingent
or timeless policy should consider both the intertemporal and the intergenerational welfare
eRects.
The basic structure of this chapter is closely related to the static three-period model
studied by Lorenzoni (2008). In the present chapter, to ensure dynamic tractability, three-
2Krugman (2000) emphasizes the role of asset “Kre sales” played during the 1990’s Knancial crisis in his
book, while Pulvino (1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) present large evidence to support the existing
of Kre sales.
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period events have instead been expedited to occur within two periods. Furthermore, to
study the business cycle implications of Knancial frictions and to understand the frequency
and persistence of Knancial distress, the model is extended as an overlapping-generations
economy with both labor and capital. As a result, Kxed endowments are replaced by wage
income. The persistence of business cycle shocks due to Knancial frictions has been studied
by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In their paper, the Knancial frictions are the auditing costs
and the production shock hits the sector producing the output instead of capital. Negative
productivity shocks reduce investment by decreasing entrepreneurial net worth and thus
make the investments in the subsequent periods lower. In chapter 2, the productivity shock
aRects the Krst period output of the entrepreneur, which is akin to the capital formation in
Bernanke and Gertler.
The structure of chapter 2 is as following. In the next section, the basic framework of the
stochastic overlapping-generations model is introduced. Section 2.3 constructs individuals’
problems and section 2.4 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. The dynamic analysis
is derived in section 2.5 and welfare properties are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 The Environment
A stochastic overlapping-generations model is laid out below to study the intertemporal
and intergenerational transmission of productivity shocks. Time is discrete and indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . .+. The closed economy consists of an inKnite sequence of two period lived
agents, an initial old generation and an inKnitely lived government. Agents born at time t
are called generation t. There are two kinds of goods in the economy, consumption goods
and capital goods. Consumption goods are perishable immediately at the end of each period.
Agents can convert consumption goods into capital 1 to 1 whenever they want, but once the
capital is formed, it cannot be transformed back to consumption goods again. Capital goods
which are produced by generation t are fully depreciated with the demise of that generation.
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Also, if capital is used more than once for production, it needs to be maintained before its
reuse. In each period, the good price is normalized to 1 and the capital price is denoted as
qt. The timeline for generation t is showed in Appendix A.1.
In the following analysis, superscripts above variables indicate the type and the date of
birth of the agents, while the subscripts show when the actions are executed. For example,
cc,tt+1 represents the time t+1 consumption by the consumer born at time t. Variables without
superscripts are market values that cannot be decided by agents; for instance qt is the capital
price in period t as introduced above.
Within each generation, there are two types of agents of equal mass, consumers and
entrepreneurs. The population is assumed to be stationary over time and the number of
each type of agents is normalized to 1. Consumers are risk neutral and maximize their
utility function represented by Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

, whereas entrepreneurs are risk neutral as well
but only care about their last period consumption and the utility function is Et

ce,tt+1

.
The generation t entrepreneur is endowed with Le,t units of labor at the beginning of
period t. She works in period t for labor income as consumption goods. Since the entrepre-
neur does not value leisure she will work full time and gets labor income wtLe,t where wt
is the market wage level. The entrepreneur has access to a technology which can give her
at(s)k
e,t
t units of consumption goods within period t if k
e,t
t is invested. at(s) is a random
variable depending on the aggregate state s, which can take two values, good and bad with
probability h and l. In good state h, at(h) = ah and in bad state l, at(l) = al where
ah > al > 0. The state variable is identical and independently distributed across periods.
The entrepreneur needs to maintain the capital she used in period t before it can be reused in
period t+1 production process. The per capital maintenance cost is  units of consumption
goods. The capital fully depreciates if the maintenance cost is not paid. The entrepreneur
can maintain part of the used capital. If she decides to maintain fraction t(s)( 1) of
capital, then the total maintenance costs are t(s)k
e,t
t and the undepreciated capital level
is t(s)k
e,t
t . The entrepreneur can also reinvest at the end of period t. With maintenance
7
and the reinvestment, the total capital used by the entrepreneur in period t + 1 is ke,tt+1(s).
Production of the consumption goods in period t+1 is governed by constant return of scale
technology AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) where L
e,t
t+1(s) is the labor used by the entrepreneur and
depends on state s for period t. In period t + 1, the entrepreneur produces, pays wages to
workers and then consumes the rest of her output. ke,tt+1(s) fully depreciates at the end of the
period. To simplify analysis, assume that the production technology is in the Cobb-Douglas
form A

ke,tt+1(s)
 
Le,tt+1(s)
1
from now on.
The generation t consumer is endowed with Lc,t units of labor at the beginning of period
t. In period t, the consumer supplies inelastic labor in the market and gets wtLc,t units of
consumption goods as labor income. The consumer owns a "riskless" technology and she
can invest kc,tt+1(s) capital in this "riskless" technology at the beginning of period t + 1 and
obtains Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) units of consumption goods at the end of period t + 1. The function
Fc(.) is increasing, strictly concave, and twice diRerentiable. It is assumed that Fc(0) = 0,
F c(0) = 1, and F

c(k
c,t
t+1(s)) is lower bounded by q.
The inKnitely lived government imposes a policy with a capital requirement of the form
ke,tt  wtLe,t in each period t. The initial old entrepreneurs and consumers are endowed
with ke,10 and k
c,1
0 capital at the beginning of period 0, respectively. Within each period,
the goods market, capital market and labor market are perfectly competitive.
2.2.1 Financial Contracts with Limited Commitment
In period t, the entrepreneur oRers a state-contingent Knancial contract to the consumer.
The contract has 5 variables and is of the form

de,tt , d
e,t
t (s), d
e,t
t+1(s)
	
. de,tt is the loan from
the consumer to the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t. While de,tt (s) and d
e,t
t+1(s) are
state-contingent payments from the entrepreneur to the consumer after production processes
by the entrepreneur in period t and t+ 1, respectively, for each state s.
The entrepreneur considers the Knancial frictions when designing the contract. Both
entrepreneurs and consumers are lack of commitments to future payments. Think about
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the no-default conditions for the entrepreneur Krst. Suppose in period t, the entrepreneur
wants to deviate from the repayment de,tt (s). She needs to make a take-it-or-leave-it oRer
to the consumer and the consumer can choose whether to accept it or not. If the consumer
denies the oRer, then the Krm is liquidated. At the end of period t, a Krm owns capital stock
ke,tt (without maintenance) and proKts at(s)ke,tt . After liquidation, (1 ) of Krm’s current
proKts vanishes (  (0, 1)), and the rest of the proKts and all the capital stock will go to
the consumer. With per unit maintenance cost  and capital price qt(s), the net value of
a liquidated Krm in period t is (at(s) + max{qt(s) , 0}) ke,tt units of consumption goods.
Moreover, if the entrepreneur chooses to default at the end of period t + 1, the net value
of the liquidated Krm is 

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

instead due to the fully
depreciation of capital. With the net value of liquidated Krms, the necessary and suQcient
conditions for the entrepreneur without default can be expressed as following:
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)  (at(s) + max{qt(s) , 0}) ke,tt (2.1)
de,tt+1(s)  

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

(2.2)
for s = l, h. Now it is worth explaining why the above two inequalities are both the nec-
essary and the suQcient conditions. If Krm’s net values of liquidation are greater than the
contractual payments, the consumer can always reject the take-it-or-leave-it oRer and make
beneKts. The entrepreneur loses and ends up with nothing in this case. That is, conditions
(2.1) and (2.2) are suQcient conditions for never-default. On the other hand, when the
contractual payments are greater than the net values of Krm, the entrepreneur can provide
a take-it-or-leave-it oRer with the current and future repayments greater than the net values
of liquidated Krm but still smaller than the original contractual payments. The consumer
will accept this oRer and the entrepreneur will always default. That is, conditions (2.1) and
(2.2) are necessary conditions for never-default.
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Although the liquidation value of the Krm can be treated as collateral (Lorenzoni 2008),
they are not the source of ineQciency focused on the welfare analysis later.
The consumer can also default contract. There is no reason for her to accept negative
repayments from the entrepreneur at any point of time. Thus, the no-default constraints
from the lack of commitment on the consumer’s side in each period are:
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)  0 (2.3)
de,tt+1(s)  0 (2.4)
for s = l, h.
The model only considers the bilateral Knancial contract between one entrepreneur and
one consumer. This type of contract is without loss of generality in the current environment
when there are only aggregate uncertainty (Holmström and Tirole 1998) and equal mass of
identical entrepreneurs and identical consumers. Cross-holding of Knancial securities can be
created by zero-proKt Knancial intermediations and the limited commitment conditions for
those contracts can be converted and aggregated as above conditions (2.1) -(2.4) as well.
2.3 Individuals’ Problems
2.3.1 The Entrepreneur’s Problem
In period t, generation t entrepreneur can invest her labor income wtLe,t and the borrowing
de,tt from the generation t consumer,
ke,tt  wtLe,t + de,tt (2.5)
After the production process in period t, the entrepreneur receives current revenues
at(s)k
e,t
t and pays back d
e,t
t (s) to the consumer. The entrepreneur also needs to cover the
maintenance costs by her funds and uses the rest to Knance new investment.
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The resource constraint at the end of period t is
qt(s)(k
e,t
t+1(s) t(s)k
e,t
t )  at(s)ke,tt  t(s)k
e,t
t  de,tt (s) (2.6)
Finally, in period t+ 1, the entrepreneur produces with constant return of scale technol-
ogy. She uses the capital return to consume after paying back the debt repayments to the
consumer. The period t+ 1 resource constraint is,
ce,tt+1(s)  AF (k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s) d
e,t
t+1(s) (2.7)
The entrepreneur oRers a Knancial contract that the consumer will always accept. The
consumer accepts the contract when her utility for taking the contract is greater than the
one when she rejects the contract. In addition, the consumer’s consumption in each period
should be non-negative. When the consumer accepts the contract, her expected utility
Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

is
&
s

wtL
c,t  de,tt + de,tt (s) qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) + Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

and her consumption proKle is
cc,tt (s) = wtL
c,t  de,tt + de,tt (s) qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) (2.8)
cc,tt+1(s) = Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) + d
e,t
t+1(s) (2.9)
On the other hand, if the consumer rejects the contract, her expected utility is
&
s

wtL
c,t  qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) + Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s))

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Assume that cc,tt (s)  0 and cc,tt+1(s)  0 for s = l, h. The consumer’s participation
constraint is then given by
de,tt 
&
s

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

(2.10)
Finally, the government imposes a capital requirement for the investment at the beginning
of period t, that is,
ke,tt  wtLe,t (2.11)
Thus, the generation t entrepreneur’s individual problem is to maximize her expected
utility
$
sce,tt+1(s) by choosing a Knancial contract

de,tt ,

de,tt (s), d
e,t
t+1(s)
	
, investment de-
cisions

ke,tt , {t(s), ke,tt+1(s)}
	
, labor demands {Le,tt+1(s)} and consumption levels {ce,tt+1(s)},
given wage levels {wt, wt+1(s)} and capital prices {qt(s)}. The entrepreneur faces four sets
of constraints: the resource constraints (2.5)-(2.7), the consumer’s participation constraint
(2.10), the no-default constraints (2.1)-(2.4), and the capital requirement constraint (2.11).
2.3.2 The Consumer’s Problem
Facing the wage level wt and capital prices {qt(s)}, the consumer can decide whether to
accept a contract or not, and then which contract to accept. She maximizes expected utility
Et

cc,tt (s) + c
c,t
t+1(s)

by setting consumptions

cc,tt (s), c
c,t
t+1(s)

and the investment

kc,tt+1(s)

with the riskless technology. Since the entrepreneur always makes the consumer to accept the
contract, the budget constraints for the consumer are (2.8) and (2.9), and the consumption
in each period is non-negative (cc,tt (s)  0 and cc,tt+1(s)  0 for s = l, h).
The model only considers a multi-period Knancial contract

de,tt , d
e,t
t (s), d
e,t
t+1(s)
	
with
limited commitments. The length of the contract, whether it is multi-period or single period,
is irrelevant in this model. Appendix A.2 shows that the problems with two single-period
contracts under limited commitments are equivalent to the individuals’ problems discussed
above.
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2.3.3 Assumptions
Before solving individuals’ problems, few useful assumptions about parameters are needed
to be introduced.
Assumption 2.1. The per unit maintenance cost  is less than the lower bound q of
the derivative of the production function for riskless technology.
 < q
The consumer is the buyer in capital market, and her capital demand can be achieved
by the proKt maximization problem and is characterized by the Krst order condition qt(s) =
F c(k
c,t
t+1(s)). 1  F c(k
c,t
t+1(s))  q implies that 1  qt(s)  q and thus max{qt(s)  , 0} =
qt(s) . In other words, assumption 2.1 is the no-scrapping condition for the entrepreneur,
t(s) = 1 for s = l, h in any periods.
Assumption 2.2. The marginal return of capital for the constant return of scale tech-
nology is greater than 1,
AF1(k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) > 1 (2.12)
with a suQciently small  such that
AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) < q (2.13)
Assumption 2.2 ensures that the no-default constraint (2.2) is binding. That is,
de,tt+1(s) = 

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

(2.14)
At the end of period t, the generation t entrepreneur has three ways to Knance her
investment. She can (1) convert the consumption goods into capital herself at price 1, (2) buy
capital in market at price qt(s)( 1), or (3) borrow at the marginal cost of de,tt+1(s)/k
e,t
t+1(s)
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from the consumer and buy capital at price qt(s). Since qt(s)  1 from assumption 2.1, the
entrepreneur will always prefer method (2) to (1). Now compare method (2) with (3) for
the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur chooses method (2), the marginal rate of return
of the wealth at the end of period t is
z
(2)
1s =
AF1(k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
qt(s)
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur chooses method (3), and if equation (2.14) holds,
by (2.13)
de,tt+1(s)
ke,tt+1(s)
= AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s) < q  qt(s)
and the marginal rate of return on entrepreneurial wealth at the end of period t is then given
by
z
(3)
1s =
AF1(k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) d
e,t
t+1(s)/k
e,t
t+1(s)
qt(s) de,tt+1(s)/k
e,t
t+1(s)
=
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
qt(s) AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
By (2.12),
z
(3)
1s > z
(2)
1s
Thus, the entrepreneur will borrow as much as possible to Knance her investment at the end
of period t, which coincides the equation (2.14) as assumed.
Assumption 2.3.
(1 ) ahke,tt  ke,tt + AF (ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h)) > 0 (2.15)
alk
e,t
t  ke,tt + AF (ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l)) < 0 (2.16)
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The Krst condition in assumption 2.3 implies positive investment at the end of period t
in good state (ke,tt+1(h) k
e,t
t > 0), while the second condition indicates negative investment
at the end of period t in bad state (ke,tt+1(l)  k
e,t
t < 0). Since the entrepreneur’s utility is
strictly increasing, the condition (2.6) is binding. With t(s) = 1, (2.6) can be written as
qt(s)(k
e,t
t+1(s) k
e,t
t ) = at(s)k
e,t
t  ke,tt  de,tt (s) (2.17)
From the no-default constraint (2.3) and result (2.14),
de,tt (s)  de,tt+1(s) = AF (k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) (2.18)
The equality comes from the Cobb-Douglas form of the production function and the labor
market clear condition (which will be introduced later). Substituting (2.18) in (2.17) gets,
qt(s)(k
e,t
t+1(s) k
e,t
t )  at(s)ke,tt  ke,tt + AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
If the right hand side of the above inequality is smaller than 0 in bad state, then ke,tt+1(l)
ke,tt < 0 and the new investment is negative. In addition, from the no-default constraint (2.1),
assumption 2.1 and result (2.14), one gets,
de,tt (s)  de,tt+1(s) (at(s) + qt(s) ) k
e,t
t
= AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) (at(s) + qt(s) ) k
e,t
t (2.19)
Replace de,tt (s) in (2.17) with (2.19) and then since qt(s)  1,
qt(s)(k
e,t
t+1(s) k
e,t
t )  (1 ) at(s)ke,tt  qt(s)ke,tt + AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
 (1 ) at(s)ke,tt  ke,tt + AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
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In good state, if the right hand side of the above inequality is greater than 0, then the
new investment is positive.
In sum, assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 together limit individuals’ choices: there is no scrapping
(t(s) = 1), the entrepreneur maximizes her borrowing ability at the end of period t and the
new investment at the end of period t is positive in good state and negative in bad state. In
addition, the following assumption 2.4 is used to prove the existence and uniqueness of the
competitive equilibrium.
Assumption 2.4.
F ”c (k
c,t
t+1 (l))k
c,t
t+1 (l) + F

c(k
c,t
t+1 (l)) + 2A

ke,tt  kc,tt+1 (l)
1
L1 > 0
1 A


ke,t,CEt
1
L1  (ah + 1 ) +
de,t,CEt+1 (h) + d
e,t,CE
t (h)
ke,t,CEt
< 0
where the superscript CE is used to denote the equilibrium values.
2.3.4 Solution to the Individuals’ Problems
Below, lemma 2.1 Krst describes how the entrepreneur chooses the optimal Knancial contract.
Later, other choice variables for individuals’ problems are derived. Intuition is provided for
the entrepreneur’s investment choice, and the idea of a “pecking order” in borrowing, that
the entrepreneur will always exhaust her borrowing ability in good state before she can
borrow against bad state, is introduced.
Lemma 2.1 If the capital requirement constraint (2.11) is not binding, the optimal )nancial
contract

de,tt , d
e,t
t (s), d
e,t
t+1(s)
	
chosen by the entrepreneur, given wage levels {wt, wt+1(s)} and
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capital prices {qt(s)}, satis)es following conditions:
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s) = 0 if z0 < z1s
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s) 

0, (at (s) + qt(s) ) ke,tt

if z0 = z1s
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s) = (at (s) + qt(s) ) k
e,t
t if z0 > z1s
de,tt+1(s) = 

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

for s = l, h, where
z1s =
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
qt(s) AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
z0 =
$
s sz1s

at (s) + qt(s)  

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

/ke,tt

1
$
s s

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

/ke,tt
and
de,tt =
&
s

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

When the capital requirement constraint (2.11) binds, then
de,tt = k
e,t
t  wtLe,t =

1
  1

wtL
e,t
if de,tt  h (ah + qt(h) ) ke,tt , de,tt (h) + de,tt+1(h) = d
e,t
t /h
de,tt (l) + d
e,t
t+1 (l) = 0
if de,tt > h (ah + qt(h) ) ke,tt , de,tt (h) + de,tt+1(h) = (ah + qt(h) ) k
e,t
t
de,tt (l) + d
e,t
t+1 (l) =
1
l

de,tt  h (ah + qt(h) ) ke,tt

de,tt+1(s) = 

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

With the optimal contract choice, the entrepreneur’s Krst time investment is
ke,tt = d
e,t
t + wtL
e,t
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and the second time investment is
ke,tt+1 (s) =
1
qt(s)

(at (s) + qt(s) ) ke,tt  de,tt (s)

(2.20)
the labor demand Le,tt+1(s) satisKes the Krst order condition
AF2(k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) = wt+1(s) (2.21)
and the consumptions ce,tt+1(s) in the last period can be obatined by set the inequality (2.7)
as equality.
The consumer accepts the contract, chooses kc,tt+1(s) such that
F c(k
c,t
t+1(s)) = qt(s) (2.22)
and cc,tt (s), c
c,t
t+1(s) satisfying equations (2.8) and (2.9).
The proof of the above lemma 2.1 is provided in Appendix A.3. The variable z0 can be
seen as the marginal rate of return on entrepreneurial wealth at the beginning of period t.
The entrepreneur can borrow from the consumer to invest at the beginning of period t and
get random return of

at (s) + qt(s)  

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

/ke,tt

at the end of period t.
With 1 extra unit of capital invested at the end of period t in state s, the entrepreneur can
obtain a return of z1s


= z
(3)
1s in assumption 2.2

. The entrepreneur makes her investment
decision by comparing the return of capital before and after the state is revealed. When
z0 > z1s, she absorbs outside funds as much as possible by increasing the promised repayment,
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s) = (at (s) + qt(s) ) k
e,t
t . When z0 < z1s, the entrepreneur decreases her
promised repayment to 0 in order to shrink the investment. When z0 = z1s, the entrepreneur
is indiRerent between the two opportunities of investment.
Assumption 2.3 indicates positive reinvestment in good state and negative reinvestment in
bad state at the end of period t. If there is positive reinvestment, the entrepreneur is potential
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buyer in capital market, which implies the consumer is the potential seller of capital. In this
case, the capital price qt(h) = 1 since the consumer can only convert consumption goods
into capital 1 to 1 necessarily. On the other hand, when there is negative reinvestment,
the entrepreneur is the seller in capital market and the consumer is the buyer. By (2.22),
qt(l) = F

c(k
c,t
t+1(l)) < 1 since k
c,t
t+1(l) = (k
e,t
t+1(l) k
e,t
t ) > 0 in bad state.
Also from assumption 2.3, it is known that ke,tt+1(l) < k
e,t
t < k
e,t
t+1(h). Since individuals
inelastically supply labor, labor market clear implies that Le,tt+1(s) = L
e,t+1+Lc,t+1 = L, then
z1h =
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(h), L)
1 AF1(ke,tt+1(h), L)
<
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(l), L)
1 AF1(ke,tt+1(l), L)
<
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(l), L)
qt(l) AF1(ke,tt+1(l), L)
= z1l
The Krst inequality comes from decreasing marginal return of capital for the production
technology, and the second inequality holds because qt(l) < 1. The above shows that the
marginal rate of return on entrepreneurial wealth at the end of period t in bad state is greater
than the one in good state. Therefore, the entrepreneur will Krst exhaust her borrowing
capacity in the good state up until de,tt (h) + d
e,t
t+1(h) = (ah + 1 ) k
e,t
t before she can
borrow against the bad state.
2.4 Equilibrium
This section Krst deKnes the competitive equilibrium with policy intervention, and then
introduces the equilibrium Knancial contract. To illustrate properties of the competitive
equilibrium by numerical experiments, parameters for two examples are listed. Moreover,
the relationship between wage income and equilibrium choice variables are studied for future
use in dynamic analysis.
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2.4.1 Equilibrium DeAnition
A symmetric competitive equilibrium, given initial wage level wt and capital requirement ,
is deKned as a sequence of wage levels{wt+1+(s)}=0 and asset prices {qt+(s)}=0, optimal K-
nancial contracts {de,t+t+ , de,t+t+ (s), de,t+t+1+(s)}=0, investment choices

ke,t+t+ , {t+(s), ke,t+t+1+(s)}

=0,
labor demands

Le,t+t+1+(s)

=0, consumption decisions

ce,t+t+1+(s)

=0 made by entrepre-
neurs, and investments

kc,t+t+1+(s)

=0 and consumption decisions

cc,t+t+ (s), c
c,t+
t+1+(s)

=0
made by consumers, that solve the entrepreneurs’ problems and the consumers’ problems
introduced in the last section for each period, and goods markets, labor markets, and capital
markets clear in all periods and states.
The labor market From the generation t entrepreneur’s problem, it is known that the
labor demand Le,tt+1(s) satisKes the Krst order condition (2.21). Since the supply of labor is
Kxed, the equilibrium labor supply Lst+1 in period t + 1, L
e,t
t+1 + L
c,t
t+1 is the market clearing
labor quantity LCEt+1 = L. Then, by replacing L
e,t
t+1(s) = L in (2.21), the labor market clearing
condition is obtained as:
AF2(k
e,t
t+1(s), L) = wt+1(s) (2.23)
The capital market In the good state, there is no exchange of capital in the market. The
capital market clearing requires (followed the analysis in assumption 2.3)
qt(h) = 1
kc,tt+1(h) = 0
In bad state, the consumer purchases capital by (2.22), and the entrepreneur sells capital
by (2.20). The capital market clearing now requires
qt(l) = F

c(k
c,t
t+1(l)) < 1
kc,tt+1(l) = k
e,t
t  ke,tt+1 (l)
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Note that the capital demand is downward sloping in qt(l)kc,tt+1(l) space, and the capital
supply
ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l) = 
1
qt(l)

(al  ) ke,tt  de,tt (l)

is also downward sloping in qt(l) 

ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l)

space due to assumption 2.3. Thus, to
have a stable equilibrium in capital market, it is required that the slope of capital supply be
greater than the slope of capital demand in absolute values. That is,
(al  ) k
e,t
t  de,tt (l)
ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l)
2 > F ”c (k
c,t
t+1(l))
Figure 2.1 shows the capital market equilibrium after a bad productivity shock, for a
given ke,tt and d
e,t
t (l).
Figure 2.1. Capital market equilibrium
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2.4.2 Equilibrium Financial Contract
The sequence of equilibrium Knancial contracts in the stochastic overlapping-generations
model follows the same property as exhibited in Lorenzoni (2008)’s three period model.
Proposition 2.1 The symmetric competitive equilibrium is unique with capital prices
qCEt (l) < q
CE
t (h) = 1
for any t, and the equilibrium )nancial contract is one of the following three types:
Type 1: 0  be,t,CEt (h) < (ah + 1 ) and be,t,CEt (l) = 0;
Type 2: be,t,CEt (h) = (ah + 1 ) and be,t,CEt (l) = 0;
Type 3: be,t,CEt (h) = (ah + 1 ) and 0 < be,t,CEt (l) 

al + qCEt (l) 

.
where
be,t,CEt (s) =
de,t,CEt (s) + d
e,t,CE
t+1 (s)
ke,tt
This proposition coincides with the previous result that the entrepreneur exhausts her
borrowing ability in good state Krst before she borrows in bad state. The proof can be found
in Appendix A.4. Below, examples of type 1 and type 3 equilibrium will be introduced and
analyzed.
2.4.3 Parameters Used in Experiments
The following Table 2.1 displays parameters used for experiments undertaken to study the
two types of equilibrium with. Although the model is very stylized, the parameters in the
numerical analysis are set to be as realistic as possible. First, since drop in asset prices
(Kre sales) is one of the key features of Knancial crisis in the real world and Kre sales occur
only after bad productivity shock in the present model, it is assumed that the probability
of good shocks is 0.9. This implies that Knancial crisis takes place once in ten periods on
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average. Second, the maintenance cost  can be treated as capital depreciation rate. Nadiri
and Prucha (1996) state that the R&D capital depreciation rate is 0.12 in the U.S. total
manufacturing sector. The value chosen for  = 0.2 here is a bit higher in order to satisfy
assumptions 2.3 and 2.4. Recall that parameter values for ah, al and  together play an
important role in determining the type of equilibrium. Similarly, for type 1 equilibrium  =
0.46 is chosen to make this type of equilibrium possible. The non-liquidation fraction 
is chosen to be small enough to restrict borrowing ability of the entrepreneur in order to
generate Kre sales. Since Kre sales are less likely to occur in experiment 1,  for type 1
equilibrium example is smaller than the one for type 3 equilibrium. The capital share  is
chosen at its standard value of 0.6 for both types. The labor ratio is set such that the Krst
period consumption for the consumer (equation (2.8)) is non-negative.
Table 2.1. The model parameterizations
Parameters Type 1 Type 3
Probability of good states (h) 0.9 0.9
Productivity of the Krst time investment in good state (ah) 0.5 0.9
Productivity of the Krst time investment in bad state (al) 0.01 0.09
Total factor productivity of the second time investment (A) 1 1
Capital share in the second time production function () 0.6 0.6
Fraction of Krm’s proKts that goes to the consumer if liquidated () 0.015 0.08
Labor endowment of the entrepreneur (Le) 1 1
Labor endowment of the consumer (Lc) 15 25
Per unit maintenance cost () 0.46 0.2
Limit inferior of the marginal productivity in riskless sector (q) 0.5 0.5
For simplicity, the riskless technology used by the consumer is chosen as
Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) = k
c,t
t+1(s)m

kc,tt+1(s)
2
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where m = 10 for type 1 experiment and m = 0.5 for type 3 experiment (The slope of the
supply in capital market is lower in type 3 experiment compared with type 1 and thus the
capital demand slope is chosen to be smaller). The quadratic form of riskless technology
speciKes a constant slope of capital demand function, which simpliKes algebra required to
verify the stability of capital market equilibrium. This production function is increasing,
strictly concave and twice diRerentiable when kc,tt+1(s)  (0, 0.025) for type 1 experiment and
when kc,tt+1(s)  (0, 0.5) for type 3 experiment.
2.4.4 Intertemporal ECects of Wage Income
As a preparation for the analysis of dynamic transmission of productivity shocks, it is Krst
important to understand the intertemporal eRects of movement in wage income. Figure 2.2
shows how equilibrium market prices {qt(l), wt+1(s)}, ex-ante indirect utility for generation t
agents and borrowing de,tt change when the Krst period wage level wt for generation t changes.
Here the capital requirement constraint does not bind. The horizontal axis is wage level wt.
The left limit w of wt is obtained by imposing a sequence of bad productivity shocks on the
economy and the right limit w is achieved by imposing continually good states. Since the
capital price qt(h) after good productivity shock is always 1, Kgure 2.2 only exhibits capital
price qt(l) after the bad shock and wage level wt+1(s) for the following period under both
types of productivity shocks as equilibrium market prices.
Figure 2.2 presents a negative relationship between wage level wt and capital price qt(l)
after the bad shock. With more wage income, the entrepreneur invests more in her capital
and thus needs to sell more capital after the shock in order to recover the maintenance costs.
Due to the Kxed capital demand curve by the consumer, the Kre sales prices decrease when
their quantities increase.
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(a) Type 1 equilibrium (b) Type 3 equilibrium
Figure 2.2. Intertemporal eRects of wage income
When wt increases, the entrepreneur increases her investments k
e,t
t+1(h) and then wt+1(h)
increases. Although the Kre sales increase as wage income increases, the positive eRects of
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wage income on ke,tt+1(l) outweighs the negative eRects from Kre sales. As a result, wt+1(l)
increases as well.
With more wage income, the entrepreneur will end up with a higher level of ex-ante
utility since the choice set is enlarged for her. The consumer’s ex-ante utility increases Krst
because of a higher wage income and second due to a larger Kre sales. Since the marginal
productivity in the riskless sector is always greater than the capital price, with more capital
used in riskless sector, the consumer earns more proKts. The slope of the "ex-ante utility
of the entrepreneur" curve is smaller than the slop of the "ex-ante utility of the consumer"
curve in Kgure 2.2, which indicates that the consumer’s utility increases more rapidly than
that of the entrepreneur as wage level increases. (Comparing the slope of the "ex-ante utility
of the entrepreneur" curve with the slop of the "welfare" curve makes the diRerence more
obvious. The welfare is the sum of the ex-ante utilities for individuals.)
The borrowing ratio t (the ratio between the borrowing d
e,t
t and the capital investment
ke,tt at the beginning of period t) decreases with the increase of wage level wt. That is,
the "poor" entrepreneur has a high willingness to borrow from outside funding. However,
the total borrowing amount de,tt increases with wage level wt, since with more income the
entrepreneur has greater ability to repay to the consumer.
2.5 Dynamics
The dynamics of the stochastic overlapping-generations model are derived numerically in this
section. A typical path of experiment of each type of equilibrium is showed Krst. The capital
requirement constraint does not bind for these two examples and the eRects of policy control
will be studied in the next section. Then the dynamics after an adverse productivity shock
are studied. The long run distributions of wages are discussed at the end of the section.
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2.5.1 Dynamic Paths of Two Examples
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show the dynamics of the economy under diRerent types in 50 periods.
Each Kgure includes the movements of 6 variables, the state of the period st (st = 1 in good
state and st = 0 in bad state), capital price qt, ex-ante utility for the entrepreneur EU e,t and
the consumer EU c,t, the wage wt, and the borrowing ratio t. For all subplots, the horizontal
axis is time t. Both experiments are conducted in 1000 periods and the Krst 100 periods’
outcomes are dropped to avoid the inLuence of starting value. Further analysis on wage
distribution is also based on these 900 points. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 only exhibit 50 periods for
clear illustration. The Kgures with t = 101 to 1000 are attached in Appendix A.5.
Figure 2.3. Dynamics of type 1 equilibrium
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Figure 2.4. Dynamics of type 3 equilibrium
The capital price drops whenever there is a bad productivity shock, and the ex-ante
utilities for individuals decrease following the period of the bad shock and so does the wage
level. With wage level decreases, the borrowing ratio increases.
2.5.2 Dynamics after Realizations of Adverse Productivity Shock
Suppose there is a bad productivity shock in period t, the generation t entrepreneur invests
ke,tt+1(l) in her last period production process, earns proKts A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1  wt+1(l)L and
pays de,tt+1(l) to the consumer. The ex-post utility for the entrepreneur is
ce,tt+1(l) = A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1  wt+1(l)L de,tt+1(l)
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Replace de,tt+1(l) by (2.14),
ce,tt+1(l) = (1 )

A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1  wt+1(l)L

= (1 )A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1
where the second equality comes from the labor market clearing condition. Since the actual
realization of bad productivity shock causes Kre sales, ke,tt+1(l) < k
e,t
t < k
e,t
t+1(h), c
e,t
t+1(l) <
ce,tt+1(h). Note that the repayment d
e,t
t+1(l) in bad state is smaller than the repayment d
e,t
t+1(h)
in good state. That is, although having less to pay back under the Knancial contract, the
ex-post utility for the entrepreneur is smaller after the bad shock than the ex-post utility for
her in the absence of bad shock.
Now, consider the eRects on generation t consumer of bad productivity shock in period
t. By (2.8) and (2.9), the ex-post utility for the consumer after the bad shock is
cc,tt (l) + c
c,t
t+1(l)
= wtL
c,t  de,tt + de,tt (l) + de,tt+1(l) + Fc(k
c,t
t+1(l)) qt(l)k
c,t
t+1(l)
By proposition 2.1, de,tt (l) + d
e,t
t+1(l)  d
e,t
t (h) + d
e,t
t+1(h). That is, the consumer is hurt by
getting less repayments after the bad shock. However, due to Kre sales, the consumer will
buy capital and earn positive proKts in the riskless sector, which will increases her ex-post
utility. Thus, whether the consumer will be beneKt or not by the bad shock is not clear.
For the two experiments undertaken here, the consumer’s ex-post utility is smaller under the
bad shock than the one when there is no bad shock.
After the bad shock, because of decreasing marginal productivity of labor, the wage level
wt+1 in period t+1 is smaller than the one without the bad shock. With lower wage income,
the wealth of generation t + 1 entrepreneur and consumer decreases as shown in Kgure 2.2.
The borrowing ratio increases due to a decrease in wage. In period t + 2, wage wt+2 is
smaller than that otherwise would be and the transmission of bad shock passes to all future
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generations. That is, the actual realization of adverse productivity shock causes Kre sales
with drop in capital price, and then by reducing future productivity, decreases the income
and wealth of all future generations.
2.5.3 Long Run Distributions of Wages
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show the distributions of wages for the two diRerent types of equilibrium.
The height of each bar is the relative number of observations (probability), while the sum
of the bar heights is 1. The horizontal axis is wage. The analysis below focuses on type 1
equilibrium, while the distribution of wages for type 3 equilibrium follow closely.
Figure 2.5. Long run distribution of wages (type 1 equilibrium)
30
Figure 2.6. Long run distribution of wages (type 3 equilibrium)
The wage distribution is discrete and exhibits mutli-modal property. Suppose the econ-
omy start with wt. Due to uncertain productivity in the Krst period, the period t+ 1 wage
steps either up to wt+1(h) or down to wt+1(l). The wage change is not continuous. For exam-
ple, with wt 	 0.0026 to begin, wt+1(l) 	 0.0021. There are some wage levels that cannot be
realized and thus the wage distribution is discrete. Furthermore, recall that the probability
of good state is 0.9. Thus, a sequence of good states is more likely to happen than a sequence
of bad shocks. With a sequence of good states, the wage level converges to its right limit w.
That is, if wt = w, then wt+1(h) = w. On the other hand, with a sequence of bad shocks,
the wage level goes to its left limit w. When wt = w, then wt+1(l) = w. From Kgure 2.3,
w 	 0.0026 for the type 1 example. And with wt 	 0.0021 to begin, wt+1(h) 	 0.00235 and
wt+2(hh) 	 0.0026. That’s why the wage distribution has peaks around wage levels 0.0021,
0.00235 and 0.0026.
The probability when wage levels are greater than 0.0024 is 89.44%, which is little less
than the probability of the occurrence of good states, while the probability when wage levels
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are below 0.0021 is 11.33%, which is little greater than the probability of the bad states.
This is because if the economy starts with the lowest wage level, wt+1(h) is less than 0.0021
even with good state in period t.
2.6 Welfare
This section studies the impact on welfare of the policy with a capital requirement of the
form ke,tt  wtLe,t. Following Bhattacharya and Singh (2008), the welfare for this stochastic
over-lapping generations model is measured by an unconditional expected ex-ante welfare of
a "representative" generation. The welfare expression is:
Es0E0 lim
t

Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

(2.24)
= Es0 lim
t

&
st|s0

Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1



st|s0



where E0 is the mathematical expectation calculated at time 0 and thus depends on the
initial state s0. The state variables in period 0 are capital levels held by the initial old
generation. Es0 is the expectation operator across all possible initial states. s
t is the history
of states up and until period t and  (st|s0) is the probability of observing st conditional upon
the realization of s0. The inKnitely lived government chooses optimal capital requirement 
to maximize welfare (2.24). Other than the capital requirement policy, the government has
no direct control of markets. In other words, there are still limited commitment of Knancial
contracts and the capital prices are determined by competitive markets. Agents solve their
individuals’ problems under the policy as shown in section 2.3.
The government’s problem is solved numerically in two steps. First, the expectation
conditional on initial state s0 is formed. Given ,

Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

is calculated
for 1000 periods with a start wage level w0. Then the average of the last 900 periods ex-ante
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welfare is used to approximate the period 0 expected welfare:
E0 lim
t

Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

	 1
900
1000&
t=101
Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1
 |s0 (2.25)
Next, using the discrete wage distribution shown in Figure 2.5 and 2.6 as the distribution
of initial wages, the expectation of (2.25) as the unconditional expectation of welfare is
computed:
Es0E0 lim
t

Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1

	
& 1
900
1000&
t=101
Et

ce,tt+1

+ Et

cc,tt + c
c,t
t+1
 |s0

Pr(s = s0)
As a result, the capital requirement  which gives the highest welfare is the optimal policy
choice. For the two experiments conducted in this paper, the starting wage level w0 has no
inLuence on the average of the last 900 periods ex-ante welfare from 1000 periods experi-
ments. Therefore, (2.25) can be used as the approximation of the unconditional expectation
of welfare. Below Kgure 2.7 shows the relationship between diRerent capital requirement
level and the percent change between welfare with capital control and without control for
type 1 equilibrium.
As can be seen from Kgure 2.7, when capital requirement 
 = 78.4%, the welfare with
capital control is about 0.0002% greater than the welfare without any control. This welfare
increase under the policy is quite small since without capital control, the maximum welfare
is 19.35% more than the minimum welfare in the business cycles itself. Figure 2.8 shows that
the optimal policy restricts borrowing most likely after period of productivity shock when
wage income is low (high income implies lower borrowing ratio as showed in Kgure 2.2 and
low wage periods mostly likely happen after productivity shock in previous period).
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Figure 2.7. Capital requirement and percentage change in welfare (type 1 equilibrium)
Figure 2.8. Borrowing ratio with and without capital control
Borrowing less can increase the ex-ante welfare for the current generation due to pecu-
niary externality. However, the impact on future generations depends on whether there is
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a bad shock in the current period. Consider the welfare improvement of current generation
from the policy control Krst. Suppose there is a small decrease dke,tt in the Krst time invest-
ment ke,tt for the entrepreneur. If all market prices (wage and capital prices) are Kxed, the
change in entrepreneur’s utility is 0 due to Krst order conditions. In particular, the entre-
preneur’s wealth decreases by z0dk
e,t
t due to less investment at the beginning of period t and
increases by z1hdk
e,t
t due to less repayments to the consumer in good state at the end of pe-
riod t (z0 = z1h for type 1 equilibrium). The consumer’s ex-ante welfare is unchanged as well,
facing the same prices. However, in general equilibrium, less investments at the beginning
can imply less Kre sales of used capital. Suppose the capital price after the bad productivity
shock increases by dqt(l). The consumer is hurt by earning less proKts lkc,tt+1(s)dqt(l), while
the entrepreneur’s utility increases by lz1lkc,tt+1(s)dqt(l). Since z1l > 1, the total welfare of
agents increases when ke,tt decreases in a small amount. Figure 2.9 shows the welfare change
of current generation with diRerent capital requirement levels when wt = 0.0025. The entre-
preneur chooses borrowing ratio at CEt = 0.2128 while the social optimal borrowing ratio
ot = 0.2 which is smaller than the one in competitive equilibrium without policy control.
That is, there is ex-ante over-borrowing. And a capital requirement with  = 80% can force
the economy to end up with the social optimal level for the current generation.
With binding capital requirement, future generations are hurt by starting with lower
wage income when there is a bad productivity shock in period t and they are beneKt by
earning higher wages if there is no bad shock. With policy control, the Kre sales amount
decreases (capital price increases) while the ex-post capital used in the last period production
decreases as well. As a result, the wage income for the next generation declines if there is
a bad shock in the current period. This happens because of limited commitment which
causes the repayments to the consumer in the Krst period decline in good state. And that’s
why a policy which restricts borrowing in all periods may decrease the welfare: only current
generation beneKts but all following generations are hurt.
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Figure 2.9. Current welfare and the borrowing ratio
The relationship between diRerent capital requirement levels and the percent welfare
change with and without capital controls for type 3 equilibrium is shown in Kgure 2.10. Since
for type 3 equilibrium, decreasing borrowing cannot increase (actually decrease) welfare for
the current generation, the policy can only beneKt agents by increasing future wage income
if there is no bad shock. It is no surprise that for the experiment, less borrowing decreases
welfare. Because the capital requirement constraint does not always bind, the following
proposition follows.
Proposition 2.2 Under limited commitments in )nancial contracts and competitive capital
market, a capital requirement  can always increase welfare.
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Figure 2.10. Capital requirement and percentage change in welfare (type 3 equilibrium)
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter develops a stochastic overlapping-generations model with Knancial channel
of shock transmission. In the period with adverse productivity shock, the entrepreneur’s
investment cannot be fully Knanced with outside funds due to the limited commitment. Fire
sales occur after the bad shock and the capital price drops. The wage in the next period
decreases since the marginal productivity of labor decreases. The income change for the
next generation transmits the impact of the adverse shock to the future. Due to the discrete
distribution of the productivity factor of the Krst time technology at(s), the long run wage
distribution is also discrete.
As a theoretical exercise, chapter 2 also shows that ex-ante over borrowing could occur
and a policy to address over borrowing can increase total welfare. By restricting borrowing,
the ineQciency caused by the pecuniary externality can be diminished by reducing ex-post
Kre sales. The current generation beneKts and future generations proKts if there is no bad
shock in current period. However, as shown by the examples in the paper, the increase in
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welfare under the optimal policy control is quite small. On the other hand, if the return
to investment is suQciently high, the individuals’ optimal choices would be the socially
optimal as well, which limits the possibility of over borrowing ex-ante. Whether there is over
borrowing in the economy depends on the equilibrium types. A calibration exercise to match
the model to data and come up with realistic policy prescriptions is left for future research.
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CHAPTER 3. FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT IN A GLOBAL
GAME WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter extends Melitz’s (2003) model of Krm entry and exit decision as a global game
with incomplete information. In the model presented, Krms pay an irreversible entry cost
to enter the market before they know their own productivity or the productivity of their
competitors. In the second stage, Krms realize their own productivity that also acts as a
signal for forecasting the mean productivity of its competitors. At this stage, it can choose
to exit or stay in the market. If it chooses to stay, it incurs a Kxed production cost before
it produces and earns market revenues. Firms’ choices are strategic substitutes because an
incumbent’s payoR is decreasing in the mass of competing Krms.
Firm heterogeneity plays a critical role in the model since a Krm makes stay/exit deci-
sion in the second stage based on its realized productivity level.3 This chapter follows Melitz
(2003) to model Krm heterogeneity. In Melitz’s model, Krms with diRerent productivity mo-
nopolistically compete with each other (Krugman (1979)), and the representative consumer
has a constant elasticity of substitution between any two products (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).
Despite Krm heterogeneity, the supply side of the market is conveniently aggregated and then
all aggregates are summarized through a representative Krm with an aggregate productivity
3If Krms have same level of productivities in the second stage, they will all stay or exit the market in a
symmetric equilibrium. If all entry Krms leave the market, the economy ends up with no producers. If all
Krms stay in the market, the proKt for each Krm equals to the irreversible entry costs due to free entry. And
the mass of entry/existing Krms is the one such that clears the labor market.
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level. Here, the aggregate productivity only depends on the distribution of producing Krms
but not on the number of Krms. Thus, Melitz’s method helps to make the model tractable
enough while still allowing for Krm heterogeneity.
In general, global games with incomplete information generate more than one type of
equilibrium. In a stylized game of a binary choice between going to a bar versus not going,
Karp, Lee, and Mason (2007) characterize a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, a non-
monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, and a mixed strategy equilibrium in their study. In a
monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, an individual who receives a signal greater than the
switching point will "go" and those with a signal less than the switching point will "don’t
go". Karp, Lee, and Mason (2007) show that monotonic pure strategy equilibria exist if an
individual’s signal about the underlying state is imprecise (large variance) and there is a
small amount of congestion (small number of people will go to the bar). They also discuss
properties of non-monotonic pure strategy equilibria under (unproven) assumption that the
equilibria exist. Moreover, Karp, Lee, and Mason (2007) show that the only type of mixed
strategy equilibria is the non-monotonic mixed strategy equilibria. The uniqueness of equi-
librium has not been addressed in their paper. Since the existences of non-monotonic pure
strategy equilibria and mixed strategy equilibria are hard to show, and with Krm heterogene-
ity, a natural conjecture is that Krm with higher level of productivity will earn higher proKts
and then stay in the market, chapter 3 focuses only on monotonic pure strategy equilibria.
A large body of literature focuses on global games under strategic complementarity.
When decisions are strategic complements, there can be multiple equilibria or a unique
equilibrium.4 Morris and Shin (1998) show the existence of a unique equilibrium when a
small noise is added to the fundamental (state) random variable on the economy. Although
the decisions of players in Morris and Shin’s (1998) model are strategic complements, the
present chapter follows their steps for identifying the existence of a unique equilibrium.
4For multiple equilibria, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on bank runs and Krugman (1991) on external
economics; and for unique equilibrium, see Vives (1990), Morris and Shin (2001) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1990).
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A number of researchers have also studied global games with strategic substitutes. When
studies multimarket oligopoly, Bulow (1985) states that when decisions are strategic substi-
tutes, the relative payoR is always decreasing, and when decisions are strategic complements,
the relative payoR is always increasing. In a game with incomplete information, Bulow
(1985)’s statement is still true if an individual only receives a signal about a fundamental
state variable that reveals no idiosyncratic information. (See Karp, Lee, and Mason (2007),
and Morris and Shin (1998)) However, in this chapter, an individual’s signal serves two pur-
poses. First, it reveals the true productivity of the Krm receiving this signal, and second
it serves as a signal of the mean productivity of all other Krms. As a result, despite deci-
sions being strategic substitutes, the global game in this paper may still have a monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium. With some parametric restrictions, the game in chapter 3 indeed
has a unique pure strategy equilibrium. Unlike the present chapter, the decreasing relative
payoR property for strategic substitutes is the reason for the absence of monotonic pure
strategy equilibrium in Karp, Lee and Mason (2007). Athey (2001) discusses monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium in a game with incomplete information that relies on a single cross
condition (SCC): once the SCC is satisKed, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in every
Knite-action game. This SCC is stated by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) as “when choosing
between a low action and a high action, if a low type of player weakly prefers the higher
action, then all higher types of agent weakly prefer the higher action as well.” The present
chapter utilizes the SCC property for the equilibrium proKle of strategies to prove the exis-
tence of a unique equilibrium. Here, the SCC in monotonic pure strategy equilibrium can
be speciKcally stated as: when productivity level is less than a threshold productivity, Krms
will exit the market. On the other hand, if the threshold productivity Krm Knds it proKtable
to stay all higher productivity Krms will also stay.
In Melitz’s (2003) model on Krm entry and exit with complete information, Krms know
the distribution of productivity of all market entrants before entering the market. Once the
Krms have entered the industry and realized their productivities from a commonly known
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distribution, they choose either to stay and produce, or exit the industry. In the present
chapter, Krms know the distribution of productivities conditional on the mean productivity.
However, the mean itself is assumed to be random, and only the distribution of the mean
productivity is common knowledge. The distribution of the mean productivity is called
public information and the reciprocal of its variance is the precision of public information.
The productivity distribution conditional on the mean is called private information and the
reciprocal of its variance is the precision of private information.
Chapter 3 analytically proves the existence of a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium,
including the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The uniqueness of the equilibrium allows fur-
ther numerical exploration of comparative statics. The key Knding of the chapter is that
increasing the precision of public information can improve aggregate productivity and by
reallocating resources to more productive Krms the welfare also increases. It indicates that
the productivity growth can be generated by more precise public information without any
changes in the private information. This Knding is reinforced in chapter 4 that studies equi-
libria under more complicated public information (distribution of the mean productivity) and
more complicated private information (productivity distribution conditional on the mean).
The structure of chapter 3 is the following. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section
3.3 Krst deKnes the equilibrium and then proves the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium. Section 3.4 provides examples of the equilibrium and section 3.5 presents some
numerical comparative statics. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
This section Krst introduces the demand and the supply side of the economy. A set of relevant
aggregate relationships are then listed, and Knally the timeline of the game with incomplete
information is presented.
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3.2.1 Consumers’ Demand
A representative consumer has a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum of goods indexed
by :
U =
'

q ()	 d
1/	
,
where q () is the consumption for good  and  is the set of available goods.5 Here it is
assumed that 0 <  < 1 and then the elasticity of substitution between any two goods is
 = 1
1	 > 1. The budget constraint for the consumer is
'

p () q () d = R,
where R denotes aggregate expenditure and p () is the price of good . Then the optimal
demand for good  and the expenditure on good  are:
q () = Q

p ()
P


, (3.1)
r () = R

p ()
P
1

, (3.2)
where
P =
'

p ()1
 d
 1
1
(3.3)
is the price index and Q = R
P
is the aggregate demand. A detailed analysis of the consumer’s
problem can be found in Appendix B.1.
5In fact, U is the aggregate utility of all consumers. That is, suppose each individual has the same utility
function and Lmass of consumer’s aggregate utility function is listed as the utility function of a representative
consumer. The representative consumer is used here to follow the deKnition from Melitz (2003).
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3.2.2 Firms’ Supply Problem
Firms produce diRerentiated goods (indexed by ) by using labor input only. The production
technology for Krm i is represented by the following cost function
lp (xi) = f +
q ()
xi
(3.4)
where xi is the productivity level for Krm i. The Kxed cost f is same for all Krms and the
variable costs q()
xi
is decreasing in the productivity level. Each Krm is a monopoly over its
market and the consumer demand curve for good  has a constant elasticity of . Thus, all
Krms share the same price markup that equals /(  1) = 1/. That is, the price set by
Krm i is
p (xi) =
w
xi
(3.5)
The wage rate w is common for all Krms. Expressed in terms of labor, w = 1. With
price in equation (3.5), Krm i’s revenue r (xi), proKt (xi), and the labor used in production
lp (xi) are, respectively
r (xi) = R (Pxi)
1 (3.6)
(xi) =
r(xi)
  f =
R
 (Pxi)

1  f (3.7)
lp (xi) =
  1
 R (Pxi)

1 + f (3.8)
Note that r(xi)
 is variable proKt. A detailed solution of the producer’s problem is available
in Appendix B.2.
3.2.3 Aggregate Revenue and ProAt
Suppose a mass M of Krms (and hence M goods) exist in the market with their distribution
of productivity levels over a subset of (0,) given by 	(x). DeKne the weighted average
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productivity )x as
)x =
' 
0
x
1	(x)dx
 1
1
(3.9)
Then, as in Melitz (2003),6 the aggregate price P , aggregate quantity Q, aggregate rev-
enue R, and aggregate proKt  can be summarized by this weighted average productivity
)x:
P =M
1
1 p ()x) R = PQ =Mr ()x)
Q =M 1/	q ()x)  =M ()x)
Thus, the aggregate quantities can be related to those of a representative Krm with
productivity x˜. This is a result of a constant elasticity of substitution and monopolistic
competition, as shown by Melitz (2003). Since aggregate values can be summarized by )x
completely, )x can be viewed not only as the weighted average productivity but also the
aggregate productivity.
Two properties of the model listed below are used for further analysis. First, the average
revenue (proKt) of all Krms is also the revenue (proKt) of Krm with productivity levels equal
to )x.
r =
R
M
= r ()x) (3.10)
 = 
M
=  ()x) (3.11)
Second, the ratio of any two Krms’ outputs and revenues only depend on the ratio of
their productivity levels:
q (x1)
q (x2)
=

p (x2)
p (x1)


=

x1
x2


(3.12)
r (x1)
r (x2)
=

x1
x2

1
(3.13)
6The derivation is available in Appendix B.3.
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That is, a more productive Krm (higher xi) will be bigger (larger output and revenues),
charge a lower price, and earn higher proKts than a less productive Krm.
3.2.4 Firm Entry and Exit under Incomplete Information
In Melitz’s (2003) model on Krm entry and exit with complete information, Krms know the
distribution of productivity of all market entrants before entering the market. Once they
enter and after its own productivity is realized from this known distribution, they choose
either to stay and produce, or exit the industry. In chapter 3, Krms know the distribution
of productivities conditional on its mean. The mean itself is assumed to random, and only
its distribution is common knowledge.
The entry-exit game occurs in three stages. In the Krst stage, Krms know the distribution
of mean productivity7 and then decide whether to enter the market or not. The distribution
of  is uniform U

, 

. If Krms enter the market, each of them needs to pay entry costs fe
in the units of labor. The total mass of entry Krms in the Krst stage is Me.
In the second stage, the mean productivity  is realized as , and then Krm i gets
to know its own productivity level xi. While  itself is unknown, it is known that Xi is
uniformly distributed as U [  ,  + ] given  = . That is, Xi| ( = ) =  + i where
i  U [, ]. A Krm’s productivity level Xi is independently distributed across all Krms.
Note that xi is not only the productivity level for Krm i, but also its private signal of the mean
productivity parameter . With xi, Krm i can form the posterior distribution J|Xi=xi() of
 conditional on xi. In Appendix B.4, it is shown that when    < xi <  + ,
J|Xi=xi()  U

 (xi) ,  (xi)

(3.14)
7In what follows, capital letters represent a random variable, its lower case represents one possible real-
ization.
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where
 (xi) = max {xi  , }
 (xi) = min

xi + , 

and when xi =   ,  =  with probability of 1 while when xi =  + ,  =  with
probability of 1.
The precision of public information  is deKned as the reciprocal of the variance of  in
the present paper. That is, the precision of  when  is drawn from a uniform distribution
U

, 

is 1/V ar() = 12/

  
2
. The precision of private information is deKned as the
reciprocal of the variance of Xi| ( = ) and equals to 3/2. The relative precision of public
information and private information is deKned as the ratio between the precision of public
information and the precision of private information. If the relative precision of information
is greater than 1 (when 2 >   ), the public information is more precise than the private
information, and vice versa.
With the productivity level xi, posterior distribution of  conditional on xi, and a belief of
the equilibrium proKle of strategies Pr(X) of all other Krms, Krm i can calculate its expected
payoR of staying in the market, u(xi,Pr(X)), in the second stage.
u(xi,Pr(X)) =
' 

 (xi,Pr(X), ) dJ|Xi=xi(), (3.15)
where  (xi,Pr(X), ) is the proKt, net of Kxed cost f , given productivity level xi, a belief on
proKle of strategies Pr(X), and true mean productivity level . And the proKle of strategies
Pr(X) is deKned as
Pr(X) = {pr (xi) |xi  0} , (3.16)
where pr (xi) is the proportion of Krms who stay in the market when their productivity level
is xi. When u(xi,Pr(X))  0, Krm stays in the market, pays Kxed costs f, and enters the
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last (third) stage to produce output. Otherwise, if u(xi,Pr(X)) < 0, Krm i exits the market.
Note that when xi =   , the expected payoR of staying in the market is degenerate:
u(xi,Pr(X))|xi= =  (  ,Pr(X), ) (3.17)
and when xi =  + , the expected payoR of staying is then
u(xi,Pr(X))|xi=+ = 

 + ,Pr(X), 

. (3.18)
After some Krms have exited in second stage, the remaining mass of Krms M is expressed as
M =MePstay (Pr(X), ) , (3.19)
where
Pstay (Pr(X), ) =
' 

pr (xi) fXi|= (xi) dxi (3.20)
is the fraction of Krms staying in the market given the proKle of strategies Pr(X) and the
true mean productivity level . Note that given Pr(X), Pstay (Pr(X), ) is also the ex ante
Krst-stage probability of a Krm’s succeeding in the second stage.
In the last stage, since variable proKts r(xi)
 is always positive, all existing Krms will
produce and sell in the market. Firm i pays variable costs q()
xi
and sets price at p (xi).
From Krm’s proKt equation (3.7) and the posterior distribution J|Xi=xi() (3.14), the
expected payoR expression (3.15) can be simpliKed as
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u(xi,Pr(X)) =
' ∞
−∞

r (xi,Pr(X), θ)
σ − f

dJΘ|Xi=xi(θ)
=
' θ(xi)
θ(xi)

r (xi,Pr(X), θ)
σ − f

dJΘ|Xi=xi(θ))
=
1
σ
1
θ (xi)− θ (xi)
' θ(xi)
θ(xi)
r (xi,Pr(X), θ) dθ

− f (3.21)
when θ − ε < xi < θ + ε.
3.3 Equilibrium
This section presents the equilibrium of the game with incomplete information. Equilibrium
is first defined and then the idea of a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium is introduced. This
chapter only focuses on the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. Some critical assumptions
are first required for proving the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium. The equilibrium
is then presented and discussed.
3.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
Although firms with the same productivity level xi produce diﬀerentiated products, they
share the same level of revenues and profits. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, the propor-
tion of firms who stay in the market when their productivity level is xi, is either equal to
1 or 0. That is, all firms with the same productivity level will either stay in the market or
leave the market.
A symmetric equilibrium of the game consists of a profile of strategies Pr(X), mass
of entering firms Me (Pr(X)) in the first stage, mass of continuing firms M (Pr(X), θ) in
the second stage; aggregate price P (Pr(X), θ), aggregate quantity Q (Pr(X), θ), aggregate
revenue R (Pr(X), θ), and the probability density function μ(xi,Pr(X), θ) of productivity xi
of existing firms for any realization of Θ, where (1) pr (xi) = 1 whenever u(xi,Pr(X)) ≥ 0
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and pr (xi) = 0 whenever u(xi,Pr(X)) < 0, and Pr(X) is deKned in (3.16); (2) Me (Pr(X))
andM (Pr(X), ) satisKes (3.19) for every ; (3) P (Pr(X), ), Q (Pr(X), ), and R (Pr(X), )
solve consumers’ and producers’ problem for each xi and ; (4) labor market clears, and (5)
the expected payoR of the Krms entering the market in the Krst stage is zero.
The equilibrium is derived backwards. This part Krst presents the labor market clearing
condition and the zero expected proKt condition, enumerated as (4) and (5) in the above
deKnition.
Labor Market Equilibrium In the Krst stage, a mass Me (Pr(X)) of Krms enters the
market and each of the Krms pays entry costs fe in the units of labor. In the second stage, a
mass of M (Pr(X), ) Krms stay in the market and each of them pays Kxed producing costs
f . In the last stage, existing Krm also pays variable producing costs q()
xi
. The sum of Kxed
producing costs and variable producing costs together must equal the diRerence between
Krms’ aggregate revenue and proKt. From the aggregate equations for revenue, (3.10), and
proKt, (3.11), and the labor used for production (3.8), the labor market equilibrium after 
is realized is8
Mefe +MePstay (Pr(X), ) ((  1) (Pr(X), ) + f) = L (3.22)
where  (Pr(X), ) is the average proKt given equilibrium proKle of strategy Pr(X) and a
particular .
Free Entry Condition Before entry, a Krm’s expected proKt, based on the prior distrib-
ution of mean productivity , equals the entry costs fe.
E (Pstay (Pr(X), )  (Pr(X), )) fe = 0 (3.23)
8The derivation is in Appendix B.5.1.
50
As the mean productivity parameter  is drawn from the uniform distribution U

, 

, the
free entry condition can be simpliKed as
' 

1
  
(Pstay (Pr(X), )  (Pr(X), )) d  fe = 0 (3.24)
Some authors, for example Karp et al. (2007), assume that the underlying fundamental
parameter ( in our model) is drawn from an improper uniform distribution. This simpliKes
the expression of posterior distribution and facilitates an easy calculation of expected payoR.
However, in the present model, not only the expectation based on the posterior distribution
needs to be calculated, the expectation based on the prior distribution (3.23) also needs to be
derived. As a result, the expectation based on an improper distribution is not well deKned.
That is why the mean productivity parameter  is assumed to be drawn from a uniform
distribution U

, 

instead of an improper uniform distribution.
Once the decision to stay has been chosen in the second stage, Krms with higher produc-
tivity will reap higher proKts. A natural conjecture is that Krms will then follow a threshold
strategy. A proKle of a threshold strategies is deKned as
Pr(X) = Ik(xi) =

1 if xi  k
0 if xi < k
(3.25)
That is, a Krm with productivity level xi greater than or equal to the switching point k will
stay in the market and a Krm with productivity level xi smaller than the switching point
k will leave the market. If Krms follow the strategy described in (3.25), the equilibrium is
termed as amonotonic pure strategy equilibrium. This chapter focuses only on the monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium, and the proof of existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium is
introduced hereafter.
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3.3.2 A Monotonic Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Suppose the switching point is x, and then Krm i believes other Krms follow this equilibrium
threshold strategy
Ix =

1 if xi  x
0 if xi < x
Firm i’s expected payoR of staying in the market in the second stage is
u(xi, Ix) =
1

1
 (xi)  (xi)
' (xi)
(xi)
r (xi, Ix , ) d

 f (3.26)
when    < xi <  + , where by (3.13), the revenue for Krm i given equilibrium strategy
Ix and mean productivity  is
r (xi, Ix , ) =

xi
)x (Ix , )

1
r ()x (Ix , ) , Ix , ) (3.27)
The average productivity )x (Ix , ) in above equation (3.27) can be obtained by
)x (Ix , ) =
' +

(xi)

1 	(xi, Ix , )dxi
 1
1
(3.28)
where the density function of the productivity distribution is
	(xi, Ix , ) =



1
+x if     x
  xi   + 
0 if     xi < x <  + 
1
2 if x
 <   
not deKned if x   + 
(3.29)
Note that given ,     xi   +  for sure.
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From (3.10) and (3.7), the revenue r ()x (Ix , ) , Ix , ) for Krm with productivity level
)x (Ix , ) in (3.27) is
r ()x (Ix , ) , Ix , ) = r (Ix , ) =  ( (Ix , ) + f)
where the average proKts  (Ix , ) given equilibrium strategy Ix and mean productivity 
can be obtained by the labor market clearing condition and the free entry condition. With
threshold strategy Ix , the labor market equilibrium condition is simpliKed as
L =Mefe +MePstay (Ix , ) ((  1)  (Ix , ) + f) (3.30)
and the free entry condition is
' 

1
  
(Pstay (Ix , )  (Ix , )) d  fe = 0 (3.31)
From (3.30) and (3.31), the average proKt can be obtained as:9
 (Ix , ) =
f
  1

P estay (Ix)
Pstay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
Pstay (Ix , )
(3.32)
where Pstay (Ix , ) is the probability of staying given  and the strategy proKle Ix :
Pstay (Ix , ) =



0 if   x  
= P 1stay (Ix , ) = 2 +
x
2 if x
   <   x + 
= P 2stay (Ix , ) = 1 if  > x + 
(3.33)
9The algebra of getting the average proKt from labor market clear condition and free entry condition can
be found in Appendix B.5.2.
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and P estay (Ix) is the ex-ante probability of staying before entry in the Krst stage:10
P estay (Ix) =



0 if   x  
1

(+x)
2
4 if x
   <   x +  and   x  
= P e1stay (Ix) =
++22x
4 if x
   <   x +  and x   <   x + 
1


  x

if  > x +  and   x  
= P e2stay (Ix) =
1



  x  (+x
)2
4

if  > x +  and x   <   x + 
= P e3stay (Ix) = 1 if  > x +  and  > x + 
(3.34)
In sum, the expected payoR u(xi, Ix) (3.26) can be rewritten as
u(xi, Ix) =
1
 (xi)  (xi)
' (xi)
(xi)

xi
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f (3.35)
when  < xi < +, where the average proKt is deKned in (3.32). Depending on , , , x
and , the expressions for the probability of staying Pstay (Ix , ) and the ex-ante probability
of staying P estay (Ix) in (3.32) follow diRerent parts in equation (3.33) and equation (3.34).
The productivity ratio can be expressed as:11

xi
)x (Ix , )

1
=



Ra1 (xi, Ix , ) = (xi)
1 
(+x
)
(+)(x) if     x
 <  + 
Ra2 (xi, Ix , ) = (xi)
1 2
(+)() if x
 <   
(3.36)
Equation (3.35) is key to deriving the equilibrium.
3.3.3 Assumptions
Given a mean productivity level, a Krm’s revenue increases with it’s own productivity level.
However, Krm’s productivity also serves as a signal of the mean productivity of all other
Krms. That is, a higher productivity for Krm i means a higher expected mean productivity
10The calculation can be found in Appendix B.5.3.
11See Appendix B.5.4.
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of others and thus relatively low productivity for Krm i. This can cause a decrease in revenue.
Thus, a few assumptions are needed here to ensure the existence of a monotonic pure strategy
equilibrium.
Assumption 3.1.  = .
Assumption 3.1 indicates that when the economy is in the worst situation ( = ), the
minimum possible productivity level of Krms is 0 (xi =    = 0).
Assumption 3.2.  > 3.
Assumption 3.2 ensures that when xi increases, the expected payoR of staying for Krm i
with the equilibrium switching point xi also increases. This is a suQcient condition of the
unique solution for u(x, Ix) = 0.
Assumption 3.3. limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0.
Assumption 3.3 states that when a Krm’s productivity level is xi and the switching point
of the believed threshold strategy is also xi, the expected payoR of staying in the market is
greater than 0 as xi goes to  +  from the left. This assumption guarantees the existence
and the uniqueness of solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 .
Assumption 3.4.
g

, , , , f, fe

 f > 0,
where the expression for g

, , , , f, fe

is deKned as following.
When 2 >   ,
g

, , , , f, fe

= min

g1

, , , , f, fe

, g2

, , , , f, fe

where
g1

, , , , f, fe

=




f

1

2
+ 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
g2

, , , , f, fe

=




f

1
5
2
+ 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
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When 2    ,
g

, , , , f, fe

= min



g3

, , , , f, fe

, g4

, , , , f, fe

, g5

, , , , f, fe

g6

, , , , f, fe

, g7

, , , , f, fe

, g8

, , , , f, fe




where
g3

, , , , f, fe

=

  

1 ' 
2

( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

d
g4

, , , , f, fe

=

(  1)

 

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
( + 3)
2
f
  1

 1

1 + 2+3


 1
(f + fe)

!
g5

, , , , f, fe

=

(  1)

 

 1 1

1 + 2


 1

!

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

!
g6

, , , , f, fe

=
2



f

1
2
 + fe 
+3
2
f

1


 + 

(  1) +

  

(2 )
g7

, , , , f, fe

=
2
( + 3)


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 3
2
f
  1

 + 

1
g8

, , , , f, fe

=
2
 + 



f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

 + 

1
Assumption 3.4 ensures that the proKle of strategy Ix obtained from u(x, Ix) = 0
is indeed the proKle of strategy of the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. Note that all
assumptions are suQcient but not necessary conditions for the existence of the equilibrium.
Thus, parameters that violate above assumptions may still allow the (unique) existence of
the equilibrium.
3.3.4 The Existence of Equilibrium
In order to show that a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is Krst proved that
there is an unique solution x to the equation
u(x, Ix) = 0 (3.37)
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where u(x, Ix) follows expression (3.35) when    < xi <  + , follows expression (3.17)
when xi =   , and follows expression (3.18) when xi =  + .
Second, it needs to be shown that u(xi, Ix)  0, iR xi  x. That is, with the belief
of threshold strategy Ix as the equilibrium proKle of strategies for all other Krms, Krm i
with productivity level xi < x, will have a negative expected payoR (u(xi, Ix) < 0) and
will leave the market in the second stage; Krm i with productivity level xi > x will have
a positive expected payoR (u(xi, Ix) > 0) and will stay in the market; and Krm i with
productivity level xi = x, will have a zero expected payoR (u(xi, Ix) = 0) and will stay
in the market. It is assumed that if a Krm is indiRerent between staying and leaving, it will
stay in the market. The following will show that the solution to equation (3.37) is unique
and the proof of u(xi, Ix)  0, when xi  x will be shown thereafter.
Unique solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 To prove that the solution x to equation (3.37)
exists and is unique, it is Krst shown that the function u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing with
x. And second, u(x, Ix) < 0 when x =    and u(x, Ix) > 0 when xapproaches
 + . (limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0 is assumed in assumption 3.3.) Thus, the existence and
uniqueness of solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 is proved.
From (3.35), (3.17) and (3.18), note that u(x, Ix) is a continuous but piecewise diRer-
entiable function. Since a positive derivative is used for showing the increasing property,
the possible range of x should be divided into diRerent regions such that u(x, Ix) is dif-
ferentiable within each region. Once it is proved that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0 and thus u(x, Ix)
is increasing respect to x within each region, by continuity, u(x, Ix) is increasing with
respect to x in the whole domain of possible x. When 2 >   , there are three distinct
diRerentiable regions of x and the values of the upper and lower bounds of integration  (x)
and  (x) are listed below in table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Region of x and integration bounds when 2 >   
Case Region of x  (x)  (x)
1    < x <     x + 
2     x <  +   
3  +   x <  +  x   
Alternatively, when 2    , the three diRerentiable regions and the values of  (x) and
 (x) are:12
Table 3.2. Region of x and integration bounds when 2    
Case Region of x  (x)  (x)
4    < x <  +   x + 
5  +   x <    x   x + 
6     x <  +  x   
Moreover, for a valid monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium switching
point x must be smaller than  + . This condition should be true irrespective of whether
2 is greater or smaller than (  ). Or with mean productivity realization  such that
   < x , no Krm will have a productivity level greater than x and then no Krm will
stay in the market in the second stage. Thus, x > +  is not an equilibrium. Assumption
3.3 also rules out the possibility for x = + , which is shown in lemma 3.5.13 As a result,
when 2 >  , the increasing property of u(x, Ix) needs to be shown for case 1 and case
2. And when 2    , the increasing property needs to be shown for case 4 only. The
following lemma 3.1 and lemma 3.2 state that u(x, Ix) is increasing within regions 1 and 2,
respectively, when 2 >   , while lemma 3.3 shows that u(x, Ix) is increasing in region
4 when 2    .
12Note that when 2 =   , the interval for case 5 will degenerate to a single point.
13If x = + , when the realization of mean productivity is , the probability of stay Pstay (Ix , ) = 0,
which violates the labor market clearing condition (3.30).
58
Lemma 3.1 u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing in

  ,   

when 2 >   .
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
Lemma 3.2 u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing in

  ,  + 

when 2 >   .
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Lemma 3.1 and lemma 3.2 discuss case 1 and case 2 when 2 >   . The following
lemma 3.3 discusses case 4 when 2    .
Lemma 3.3 u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing in (  ,  + ) when 2    .
The proof of lemma 3.3 is exactly the same as the proof of lemma 3.1. Combining lemma
3.1 through lemma 3.3, the increasing property of u(x, Ix) can be proved irrespective of
whether 2 is greater or smaller than (  ). The increasing property is then summarized
in the following lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.4 u(x, Ix) is continuous and strictly increasing in x for     x <  + .
Proof. From (3.35) and (3.17), u(x, Ix) is continuous for     x <  + . When
2 > , since u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing in

  ,   

and

  ,  + 

by lemma
3.1 and lemma 3.2, u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing in [ , + ). Since u(x, Ix) is strictly
increasing in (  ,  + ) by lemma 3.3 when 2  , u(x, Ix) is also strictly increasing
in [  ,  + ).
Lemma 3.5 The solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
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Proof of u(xi, Ix)  0, iC xi  x
Lemma 3.6 If x < x, u(x, Ix) < 0.
Proof. For 2 >  , the equilibrium switching point x  (  ,  + ) can fall in region
1 and 2; while for 2    , x is in region 4 only. Depending on the region of x, when
x < x, x can fall in diRerent regions. Based on the regions of x and x, calculate u(x, Ix)
and shown that
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) < 0
Then lemma 3.6 is proved. The details can be found in Appendix B.9.
Lemma 3.7 If x > x, u(x, Ix) > 0.
Proof. As in lemma 3.6, the proof of u(x, Ix) > 0 is discussed under diRerent situations
when x falls in diRerent regions. The proof shows the global minimum of u(x, Ix) on
inteval

x,  + 

is positive. It Krst show u(x, Ix) > 0 when x =  + . Second, it shows
that the Krst order derivative of u(x, Ix) is continuous and then the local extreme value(s)
is(are) positive (by assumption 3.4). The details are in Appendix B.10.
Lemma 3.6 and lemma 3.7 together guarantee that the threshold strategy Ix is indeed
an equilibrium strategy.
Since there is a unique solution x to equation (3.37), and u(x, Ix)  0, iR x  x, the
existence of a unique equilibrium has been shown. This result is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 In an entry-exit game with incomplete information, x is the unique switch-
ing point of the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. A )rm will stay in the market in the
second stage if and only if its productivity level xi  x.
3.3.5 Equilibrium Values
Once the equilibrium switching point x is calculated, all other variable values can be easily
obtained. The expressions for the productivity distribution at the end of the second stage
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after Krms make their stay/exit decision, equilibrium values of average productivity, price,
revenue, and welfare given a realization of  are presented below. To facilitate comparative
statics, the ex ante (or expected) average productivity, price, revenue and welfare per worker
are also calculated.
The distribution density function 	(xi, Ix , ),
	(xi, Ix , ) =



1
+x if     x
  xi   + 
0 if     xi < x <  + 
1
2 if x
 <   
The probability of stay and the ex-ante probability of stay
Pstay (Ix , ) =




2 +
x
2 if x
   <   x + 
1 if  > x + 
(3.38)
P estay (Ix) =



++22x
4 if x
   <   x +  and x   <   x + 
1



  x  (+x
)2
4

if  > x +  and x   <   x + 
The mass of Krms at the beginning of the second stage, the mass of Krms at the end of
the second stage (which is also the mass of goods produced and consumed), and the expected
mass of exsiting Krms:
Me (Ix) =
L/
fe + f P estay (Ix)
M (Ix , ) = Me (Ix)Pstay (Ix , ) (3.39)
M (Ix) = E [M (Ix , )] =Me (Ix)P estay (Ix)
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The average productivity and the expected average productivity:
)x (Ix , ) =





(+)(x)

(+x)
 1
1
if x   <   x + 


(+)()
2

 1
1
if  > x + 
(3.40)
)x (Ix) = E [)x (Ix , )] =
' 

1
  
)x (Ix , ) d
The aggregate price:
P (Ix , ) =
(Me (Ix)Pstay (Ix , ))
1
1
)x (Ix , )
(3.41)
=



1


Me (Ix)
(+)(x)
2

 1
1
if x   <   x + 
1


Me (Ix)
(+)()
2

 1
1
if  > x + 
and the expected aggregate price
P (Ix) = E [P (Ix , )] =
' 

1
  
P (Ix , ) d
The aggregate revenue14
R (Ix , ) =Me (Ix)

f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1Pstay (Ix
 , )

and by labor market clearing condition, the expected aggregate revenue
R (Ix) = E [R (Ix , )] = L
Note that when

  

goes to 0, the game with incomplete information degenerates to
Melitz (2003) model, and as in Melitz model the total revenue is exactly the total labor
endowment. When    > 0 in this chapter, labor is used for Kxed entry costs and the
Kxed producing costs. By free entry condition, the ex ante entry costs is the expected proKts
14See Appendix B.11 for detail.
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once entry. Then the sum of the expected proKts and the Kx producing costs together is the
expected revenue, which equals to the labor endowment.
The aggregate quantity which equals the indirect utility of the aggregate consumer
Q (Ix , ) =
R (Ix , )
P (Ix , )
(3.42)
and the expected aggregate quantity
Q (Ix) = E [Q (Ix , )] =
' 

1
  
Q (Ix , ) d
Lastly, the total welfare (TW )
TW (Ix , ) = Q (Ix , ) (3.43)
and the expected total welfare
TW (Ix) = E [TW (Ix , )] =
' 

1
  
TW (Ix , ) d
The welfare per worker
W (Ix , ) =
TW (Ix , )
L
=
Q (Ix , )
L
(3.44)
and the expected welfare per worker
W (Ix) = E [W (Ix , )] =
' 

1
  

1
L
R (Ix , )
P (Ix , )

d
Since expectation is a linear operator,W (Ix) = [P (Ix)]1, which is the welfare per worker
in Melitz model.
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3.4 An Example
This section presents an example of the game with incomplete information and shows that
a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique. The following table 3.3 exhibits
the parameter values that satisfy assumption 3.1 through assumption 3.4. The elasticity of
substitution is chosen as 5 to make parameter assumption 3.4 hold even when 
2  (0, 6].
Table 3.3. The model parameterizations
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () 5
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 4
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) 2
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 0.1
Figure 3.1 shows the graph of u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix). From the graph, it can be seen that
u(x, Ix) is strictly increasing and has a unique solution x for u(x, Ix) = 0. Moreover,
u(x, Ix)  0, when x  x. As a result, the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists
and is unique. x = 1.491 in this example. (Note that here  +  = 2.)
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Figure 3.1. u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix)
In the above example, when x > 2, u(x, Ix) is not a increasing function with x. In fact,
in the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, given Ix , suppose Krm i has productivity level
xi and Krm j has productivity level xj. With higher productivity level xj, Krm j will earn
higher revenue than Krm i for a given  and thus a Kxed productivity distribution. This
has a positive eRect on Krm’s expected proKt. However, Krm’s productivity level also serves
as a signal of all other Krm’s productivities. With a higher productivity, Krm j believes all
other Krms will have a higher level of productivity as well. In this situation, Krm j will lose
its competitive advantage in the market and may end up with a lower revenue. This has a
negative eRect for a higher xi given Ix . In this example, 2 = 1.5 > 1 and thus x
 is in
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region 4. Consider x in region 5 (2  x < 3) for instance. Since x < 3 < x + 2 = 3.491,
u(x, Ix) =
' x+
x
1
2Ra
1 (x, Ix , x+ ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
' x+
x+
1
2Ra
2 (x, Ix , x+ ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
and then
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
1
2Ra
2 (x, Ix , x+ ) ( (Ix , x+ ) + f)
 1
2Ra
1 (x, Ix , x ) ( (Ix , x ) + f)
+
' x+
x
d
dx
1
2Ra (x, Ix
 , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
Here, the positive eRect is
' x+
x
d
dx
1
2Ra (x, Ix
 , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
and the negative eRect is
1
2Ra
2 (x, Ix , x+ ) ( (Ix , x+ ) + f)
1
2Ra
1 (x, Ix , x ) ( (Ix , x ) + f) < 0
The relative magnitudes for these two eRects in general can not be analytically evaluated
and thus the sign of d
dx
u(x, Ix) cannot be easily determined. The sign of ddxu(x, Ix)
depends on the parameters including the shape of the distributions. Some examples with
more complex non-uniform distributions will be discussed in chapter 4. The variations
in equilibria due to parameters is discussed below in the section on comparative statics.
Note, however, that when x <  +  the positive eRects dominate the negative eRects and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) > 0 can be shown analytically (see the proof of lemma 3.6 and lemma 3.7).
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3.5 Comparative Statics
This section undertakes comparative statics by examining how the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) change due to changes in parame-
ters. In particular four parameters (or cases) are considered: (1) the precision of public
information, (2) the precision of private information, (3) the elasticity of substitution, and
(4) the Kxed producing costs. Apart from the equilibrium switching point x and the ex-
pected welfare per worker W (Ix), some other variables are also included in comparative
statics discussion. This is to complete the explanation of how parameter diRerences aRect
the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) through their eRects on the equilibrium switching
point x. For example, the ex-ante probability of stay P estay (Ix), the expected average
productivity )x (Ix), and so on.
In each graph, values of variables (y-axis number) are standardized. SpeciKcally, the
coordinate of a point on the curve is the ratio between true value of the variable and true
value of that variable in a particular (standard) case. Then, the variable value of standard
case is always 1. Standardization helps to illustrate all variables’ movements in one Kgure.
In all exercises, the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique. However, in
some exercises, one or some of assumptions on parameters may have to be violated for a
complete analysis. Whenever this occurs, an explicit discussion will be provided. In each
exercise, parameters used are Krst introduced, and the graph about equilibrium variables’
values aRected by parameter change is shown thereafter. At the end of each exercise, some
economic intuition is provided.
3.5.1 Changes in the Precision of Public Information
Table 3.4 lists parameters used for the exercise when the precision of public information
changes. Other than , the higher bound of mean productivity , parameter values are the
same as in the example from last section. The labor endowment L is set to be 1 to compute
values for aggregate equilibrium variables (e.g. expected aggregate revenue R (Ix)). Since
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variance of a continuous uniform distribution U

, 

is (
)
2
12
, and by assumption 1,  = ,
then when  increases, variance increases and then the precision, as reciprocal of variance,
decreases. In this exercise,  varies from 1.001 to 6. That is, precision 12
()
2 varies from
0.48 to 1.2× 107. Since range of precision is big, natural logarithm of precision, ln

12
()
2

is used as the x-axis for Kgure 3.2, which shows how a change in the precision of public
information aRects the equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per worker
W (Ix). Note that when    = 0, the model degenerates to Melitz (2003) model with
the ex-ante survival probabilities  = 1 and Krms only produce for one period (call it Melitz
case). Choose Melitz case as the standard case for this exercise.15 That is, y-axis is the
ratio between true variable values and values for Melitz case when    = 0. For   6, all
assumptions are satisKed in this exercise. Below are table 3.4 and Kgure 3.2.
Table 3.4. Parameterizations when  changes
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () 5
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () [1.001, 6]
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) 2
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 0.1
The labor endowment (L) 1
15Variable values for Melitz case is computed diRerently using the zero cutoR proKt (ZCP) condition and
the free entry (FE) condition by Melitz.
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Figure 3.2. The eRects of changes in public precision
As ln

12
()
2

, the natural logarithm of precision of public information approaches to
inKnity, the equilibrium switching point x approaches to the cutoR productivity level of
Melitz case. And in Melitz model, the cutoR productivity level is 1.205. When ln

12
()
2

increases, x Krst increases and then decreases and the expected welfare per workerW (Ix)
decreases. Note that, to satisfy all parameter assumptions, only  varies in this exercise.
However, when  changes, not only the precision of  changes, the expectation of  changes
as well. That is, the increasing and decreasing movement of x and the decreasing of
W (Ix) are caused by a combination eRects of V ar() and E().16 To examine the impact
on x and W (Ix) by precision only, the expectation of , E() should be controlled. A
new exercise is conducted here while E() is Kxed. As a result, assumptions 3.1 and 3.4 are
violated simultaneously.
16The decreasing of E() is the main reason why W (Ix) decreases.
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Table 3.5 shows parameter setting for this new exercise when only the precision of 
changes but the expectation of  stays unchanged.  = 1 and E() = 3 in this exercise.
Note that the precision of private information given the realization of  is 12
(2)2 = 3.  varies
from 3.001 to 5, and the corresponding precision 12
()
2 varies from 0.75 to 3× 106. In this
range, the precision of public information  can be greater and smaller than the precision
of private information X| = . Figure 3.3 exhibits eRects of precision of  only on the
equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). As in Kgure
3.2, the x-axis is the natural logarithm of precision. Choose Melitz case as the standard
case for this exercise. That is, y-axis is the ratio between true variable values and values
for Melitz case when  =  = 3. Note that since assumption 3.1 and 3.4 are violated, the
analytical proof of the unique existence of the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium cannot be
applied anymore. However, the unique existence of the equilibrium is examined numerically
by checking the unique solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 and u(xi, Ix)  0, iR xi  x.
Table 3.5. Parameterizations when only precision of  changes
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () 5
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () [1, 2.999]
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 6 
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) 2
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 0.3
The labor endowment (L) 1
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Figure 3.3. The eRects of changes in public precision only
As in Kgure 3.2, as precision of  increases, the equilibrium switching point x increases
to the cutoR productivity level (3.1152) of Melitz case when  =  = 3. Consider a marginal
Krm with productivity level x(1), where x(1) is the equilibrium switching productivity
level when  = 1. Suppose there is an increase in the precision of public information and
thus 1 increases to 2. Then the marginal Krm loses its chances of earning positive proKts
since the realization of  is less likely to be low (i.e., it is likely to face more competition),
and the marginal Krm also loses chances of running into loss since the realization of  is
less likely to be high (i.e., less competition). When the Krst eRects dominate, the expected
payoR of the marginal Krm decreases and it exits the market. As a result, the equilibrium
switching point x increases as with an increase in the precision of . The following Kgure
3.4 shows that when 1 = 2.3 and x(1) = 2.8525, the expected revenue of margin Krm
with x(1) decreases when 1 increases to 2 = 2.4.
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Figure 3.4. The eRects of changes in public precision on margin Krm
In Kgure 3.4, the x-axis is , and the y-axis is the revenue r(x(1), Ix(1), ) for Krm with
productivity level x(1), facing the equilibrium strategy Ix(1), and the true realization
of  as . When  increases from 1 (x(1)) (= max(x(1)  , 1) = 1 = 2.3) to
1 (x(1)) (= min(x(1) + , 1) = 1 = 3.7), the revenue r(x(1), Ix(1), ) decreases
since more Krms compete in the labor market when  increases. The expectation of the
revenue r(x(1), Ix(1), ) equals the Kxed producing costs f . That is why x
(1) is the
equilibrium switching point when  = 1. Now, suppose 1 increases to 2 = 2.4. Then the
lower bound 2 (x(1)) = 2.4 and the higher bound 2 (x(1)) = 3.6. The marginal Krm
loses more of its positive proKts than it gains from its reduction in losses. As a result, the
marginal Krm’s expected payoR decreases and it exits the market.
Moreover, when x increases, the expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases. Since
)x (Ix) increases, the expected aggregate price P (Ix) decreases due to the Kxed markup in
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monopolistic competition. As a result, the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) increases.
W (Ix) increases due to the decreases in P (Ix). In sum, when precision of public informa-
tion increases, the equilibrium switching point x increases and then the expected average
productivity increases. By reallocating resource to more productive Krms, the expected wel-
fare per work also increases. This conclusion of welfare increases is the main Knding for
this chapter, and it will be stressed in chapter 4 when more examples using complicated
distributions are studied.
3.5.2 Changes in the Precision of Private Information
This part examines how the precision of private information aRects the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). Table 3.6 shows parameter settings.
 varies from 0.3 to 1, and the corresponding precision 12
(2)2 varies from 3 to 33.3. In this
range, the precision of private information can be greater or smaller than the precision of
public information 12
()
2 , which is 12. Figure 3.5 shows how the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) change as the precision of private
information changes. The x-axis is the natural logarithm of precision of private information.
The standard case is when the precision of public information and the precision of private
information are the same (   = 2 = 1). And then, y-axis is the ratio between true
variable values and values for standard case when ln


12
(2)2

= 2.485. Since  =  for all ,
assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are violated and then equilibrium is checked by the unique solution
x to u(x, Ix) = 0 and u(xi, Ix)  0, iR xi  x. When  < 0.3, a monotonic pure
strategy equilibrium does not exist as u(x, Ix)  0 when x > x.
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Table 3.6. Parameterizations when () changes
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () 5
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 2
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) [0.6, 2]
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 0.3
The labor endowment (L) 1
Figure 3.5. The eRects of changes in private precision
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From Kgure 3.5, it can be seen that as the precision of private information increases,
the equilibrium switching point x decreases and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix)
decreases as well. A decrease in the equilibrium switching point x causes a decrease in
the expected average productivity )x (Ix), and an increase in the expected mass of existing
Krms M (Ix). The decrease in )x (Ix) causes an increase in the expected aggregate price
P (Ix) while the increase in M (Ix) causes a decrease in P (Ix). This examples shows
that the expected aggregate price P (Ix) increases as the precision of private information
increases, indicating the eRects of )x (Ix) dominates the eRects of M (Ix) on P (Ix). As
a result of increasing P (Ix), the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) decreases.
Figure 3.6 below shows how the precision of private information aRects the equilibrium
cutoR point x and welfare per worker W (Ix) for the Melitz case when  =  = . All
parameters are the same as in table 3.6 except  = 1.5. The x-axis is the natural logarithm
of the precision of private information. The standard case is when 2 = 1, the same standard
case for Kgure 3.5.
In Kgure 3.6, as the precision of private information increases, the equilibrium cutoR point
x decreases and the welfare per worker W (Ix) decreases as well. When the precision of
private information increases while  is Kxed, a bigger precision means a smaller , indicating
a smaller portion of Krms with high productivities. With less severe competition in the
market, Krms expect to earn larger proKts and thus the cutoR point x decreases. With a
decrease in aggregate productivity, the welfare per worker decreases as well. The analysis of
why an increase in the precision of private information can cause a decrease in cutoR point
and why the standardized cutoR curve and standardized welfare curve coincide with each
other are derived in Appendix B.12.
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Figure 3.6. The eRects of changes in private precision for Melitz case
3.5.3 Changes in the Elasticity of Substitution
Table 3.7 shows parameter setting for exercise when the elasticity of substitution  changes.
The elasticity of substitution  varies from 3.2 to 6.6. In the exercise, the precision of public
information is chosen to be greater than the precision of private information such that all
parameter assumptions are satisKed for all   [3.2, 6.6]. Figure 3.7 shows how the change in
the elasticity of substitution  aRects the equilibrium switching point x and the expected
welfare per worker W (Ix). The x-axis is the elasticity of substitution , while the y-axis
is the ratio between true variable values and values for the case when  = 3.2.
76
Table 3.7. Parameterizations when () changes
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () [3.2, 6.6]
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 2
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) 2
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 0.1
The labor endowment (L) 1
Figure 3.7. The eRects of elasticity of substitution 
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When the elasticity of substitution  increases, the equilibrium switching point x in-
creases and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) decreases and then increases. With
higher level of , Krms with lower level of productivity lose revenues further and therefore
exit the market. The expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases due to the increase in
x. The expected aggregate price P (Ix) increases and then decreases owing to the com-
bination impact by increasing expected average productivity )x (Ix) and decreasing mass
of existing Krms M (Ix , ) (for a given ). Then, the corresponding expected welfare per
worker W (Ix) decreases and then increases as  increases.
3.5.4 Changes in the Fixed Production Costs
Parameter setting for exercise when the Kxed producing costs f changes is shown in table
3.8. The Kxed producing costs f varies from 0.01 to 1 and thus the ratio between the
Kxed producing costs f and the entry costs fe changes from 0.1 to 10. Figure 3.8 shows
how the change in Kxed producing costs f aRects the equilibrium switching point x and
the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). Since the equilibrium switching point x only
be impacted by the ratio between f and fe, no comparative statics analysis is conduct for
changes in entry costs fe and the x-axis for Kgure 6 is set to be ffe instead of f . The y-axis
is the ratio between true variable values and values for the case when f = fe. Note that
when f
fe
> 2, assumption 3.4 is violated. However, the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium
still exists and is unique. This can be proved by showing the uniqueness of the solution to
u(x, Ix) = 0 and u(xi, Ix)  0, iR xi  x.
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Table 3.8. Parameterizations when ( f
fe
) changes
Parameters Value
The elasticity of substitution () 5
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 2
The length of the support of productivity distribution after  is realized (2) 2
The entry costs (fe) 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) [0.01, 1]
The labor endowment (L) 1
Figure 3.8. The eRects of f
fe
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From Kgure 3.8, it can be seen that when the Kxed production cost f increases, the equi-
librium switching point x increases and the expected welfare per workerW (Ix) decreases.
The increase in x is caused by the decrease of the expected proKts since f increases. Al-
though the expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases, the expected aggregate price
P (Ix) increases since the positive impact of mass of existing Krms M (Ix , ) (for a given
) on P (Ix) dominates the negative impact of )x (Ix) on P (Ix). As a result, the corre-
sponding expected welfare per workerW (Ix) decreases as Kxed producing cost f increases.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses Krms’ entry and exit decision in a global game with incomplete in-
formation. Firms entry/exit choices are strategic substitutes. It is proved that a monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique. SpeciKcally, there is a switching productivity
level x such that Krms stay in the market if their productivity levels are greater than x,
and Krms leave the market if their productivity levels are less than x.
Comparative statics exercises show that when the precision of public information in-
creases, the equilibrium switching productivity level increases, and consequently the expected
average productivity increases. The upshot is that more precise information about the mean
productivity leads to inter-Krm reallocations toward more productive Krms. Finally, welfare
per worker increases as the precision of public information is improved.
In this chapter, it is assumed that productivity is (conditional) uniformly distributed
given the realization of mean productivity. Simple uniform distribution assumption facili-
tates analytical proof of the existence of a unique monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. Pa-
rameter assumptions 3.1 through 3.4 are speciKc to this uniform distribution case and they
guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium. To understand how distribution shapes
can aRect the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium, examples with more general
distributions need to be examined. The numerical examples with Krms’ productivities drawn
from conditional normal distribution, conditional gamma distribution, and conditional expo-
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nential distribution are discussed in chapter 4. The conclusions that (1) unique monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium exists, and (2) increasing precision of public information reallo-
cates resources to more productive Krms and thus increases welfare are validated in chapter
4. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 only consider monotonic pure strategy equilibria. In future, they
can be extended to include for non-monotonic pure strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy
equilibrium, as in Karp, Lee, and Mason (2007).
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CHAPTER 4. FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT IN A GLOBAL
GAME WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUES: EQUILIBRIA
UNDER NON-UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the study undertaken in chapter 3 on Krm’s entry and exit decision
in a global game with incomplete information. It studies whether and how the shapes of
conditional productivity distributions aRect the equilibria studied in chapter 3. In this
chapter, the mean productivity  is drawn from a truncated normal distribution. Truncated
distribution for  is used for computational convenience. Given mean productivity  = ,
Krm’s productivity level X| =  is drawn from more general (truncated) distributions, such
as truncated normal, truncated gamma, and truncated exponential distributions. Truncated
distributions forX| =  are chosen to guarantee that productivity levels are always positive.
As in chapter 3, only monotonic pure strategy equilibria are discussed. Since analytical
proof of the existence of a unique equilibrium is not easy to derive for cases with non-
uniform distributions, the existence and the uniqueness is established numerically. Using
numerical plots, it is shown that there exists only one solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 and that
u(xi, Ix)  0, iR xi  x.
Chapter 4 validates conclusions derived in chapter 3. SpeciKcally, these are: (1) a
monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists and it is unique; (2) as public information
becomes more precise, the aggregate productivity as well as economy’s welfare increases.
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However, there are some diRerences as well. Unlike the result in chapter 3, when private
information becomes more precise, the aggregate productivity and welfare are not always
decreasing when X| =  is drawn from truncated gamma distribution.
Since the model examined below is the same as the one in chapter 3, the details are
skipped. Essentials of the model and equilibrium deKnitions are introduced brieLy in Section
4.2 and 4.3. In section 4.4, the numerical results for various productivity distributions are
presented, and section 4.5 provides comparative statics. Section 4.6 presents some concluding
remarks.
4.2 The Model
Consumers’ demand, Krms’ supply, and their aggregation are the same as in chapter 3, which
relies on monopolistic Krms with diRerent productivities competing in the market while facing
a constant elasticity of product demand.
4.2.1 The Timeline
In the Krst stage, Krms pay a Kxed entry costs fe to enter the market with knowledge of the
distribution of mean productivity  but not the true .  is drawn from a truncated normal
distribution N

;	,2, , 

restricting the original normal distribution N (;	,2) to a
closed domain of

, 

. In the second stage,  is realized as  and the Krm receives its private
productivity X = xi| = . The mean productivity  is unknown to the public and X| = 
is drawn from a distribution F (x; , a, b,1,2, ...) given . Where F (x; , a, b,1,2, ...) is
a truncated distribution of X from an original distribution F (x; ,1,2, ...) on the closed
domain of [a, b]. The probability density function (pdf) of the original distribution is denoted
as f (x; ,1,2, ...). Here 1,2, ... are distribution parameters other than the mean . The
support of F (x; ,1,2, ...) covers the interval [a, b] to whatever the value of  is. After
observing their productivities x, Krms decide whether to stay in the market and pay the Kxed
production cost f , or exit the market. In the last stage, an existing Krm pays variable cost
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q
x
, sets price at p (x) and then sells outputs in the market. To ensure positive productivities,
it is assumed that a  0.
Further, the equilibria focus on X| =  drawn from non-uniform distributions. A
normal distribution relates to a case in which productivities are drawn from a symmetric
distribution, while exponential distribution covers a case when high productivity levels are
less likely than low productivity levels. The gamma distribution presents the case where the
shape of productivity distribution is between normal and exponential.
4.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, consumer maximizes utility and Krm maximizes proKts. The labor market
clears and a free entry condition at the Krst stage is satisKed. Since only monotonic pure
strategy equilibrium is considered, all the following expressions relate to such equilibria.
With threshold strategy Ix , Krm i’s expected payoR from staying is
u(xi, Ix) =
' 


xi
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) dJ|Xi=xi() f (4.1)
where xi is the productivity level for Krm i, )x (Ix , ) is the average productivity given
threshold strategy Ix and mean productivity ,  (Ix , ) is the average proKt given threshold
strategy Ix and mean productivity , and f is the Kxed production cost. J|Xi=xi() is the
conditional distribution of  by Krm i (with productivity level xi). Equations for each
variable are shown below.
• The average productivity is
)x (Ix , ) =
' b
x
(xi)

1 	(xi, Ix , )dxi
 1
1
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where the density function of the productivity distribution given Ix and  is
	(xi, Ix , ) =
f (xi; ,1,2, ...)
F (b; ,1,2, ...) F (x; ,1,2, ...)
for a  xi  b and 	(xi, Ix , ) = 0 otherwise.As a result,
)x (Ix , ) =
' b
x
(xi)

1 f (xi; ,1,2, ...)
F (b; ,1,2, ...) F (x; ,1,2, ...)
dxi
 1
1
• From the labor market condition and free entry condition, the average proKt is
 (Ix , ) =
f
  1

P estay (Ix)
Pstay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
Pstay (Ix , )
where Pstay (Ix , ) is the probability of staying given  and the strategy proKle Ix
Pstay (Ix , ) =
' b
x
f (xi; , a, b,1,2, ...) dxi
=
' b
x
f (xi; ,1,2, ...)
F (b; ,1,2, ...) F (a; ,1,2, ...)
dxi
and P estay (Ix) is the ex-ante probability of staying before entry
P estay (Ix) = E (Pstay (Ix , ))
=
' 

Pstay (Ix , )
fN (;	,2)
FN

;	,2

 FN (;	,2)
d
where fN (;	,2) is the pdf of N (;	,2) and FN

;	,2

is the cdf.
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• Consider the posterior distribution dJ|Xi=xi(). By Bayes theorem, the probability
density function of  when Xi = xi is
f|Xi=xi () =
fXi|= (xi) f ( = )%
 fXi|= (xi) f ( = ) d
=
f(xi;,1,2,...)
F (b;,1,2,...)F (a;,1,2,...)
fN(;,
2)
FN(;,
2)FN(;,
2)
% 

f(xi;,1,2,...)
F (b;,1,2,...)F (a;,1,2,...)
fN(;,
2)
FN(;,
2)FN(;,
2)
d
for     , and f|Xi=xi () = 0, otherwise.
If it can be shown that u(x, Ix) = 0 has a unique solution and u(xi, Ix)  0 when
xi  x, the existence of a unique monotonic pure strategy equilibrium is proved. The proof
is obtained numerically. The equilibrium payoR graph is displayed in the next section. Once
the equilibrium value of the switching point x is obtained, the equilibrium values of all other
variables can be easily derived using the above equations.
4.4 Numerical Examples
This section uses three examples (one each for normal, gamma and exponential distributions)
to show the existence of a unique monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. Table 4.1 exhibits
parameter values. Since gamma distribution is deKned on positive support only, the mean
of gamma distribution is positive so the lower bound of the mean,  is set to be 0.01(> 0)
instead of 0. For the exponential distribution case, the lower bound of the mean productivity
,  is set to be 1 to let the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exist. Moreover, since
exponential distribution only has one parameter, there is nothing such as an exogenous
variance parameter for X| =  when X| =  is drawn from an exponential distribution.
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Table 4.1. The model parameterizations
Value
Parameters Normal Gamma Exponential
The elasticity of substitution () 3 3 3
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 0 0.01 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 5 4.99 4
Mean of the mean productivity  (	) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Variance of the mean productivity  (2) 16 16 16
Lower bound of productivity x (a) 0 0 0
Higher bound of productivity x (b) 5 5 5
Variance of productivity x (2x) 1 1 N/A
The entry costs (fe) 0.1 0.1 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 1 1 1
The labor endowment (L) 1 1 1
Figure 4.1 shows the graph of u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix) for the three cases: normal, gamma,
and exponential productivity. From the graph, it can be seen that u(x, Ix) is strictly
increasing and has a unique solution x for u(x, Ix) = 0. Moreover, u(x, Ix)  0,
when x  x. As a result, the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique.
x = 1.555 for the normal distribution case, x = 1.875 for gamma distribution case,
and x = 2.894 for exponential distribution case. Note that u(x, Ix) is not an increasing
function with x.
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Figure 4.1.a. u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix) for normal distribution
Figure 4.1.b. u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix) for gamma distribution
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Figure 4.1.c. u(x, Ix) and u(x, Ix) for exponential distribution
4.5 Comparative Statics
This section performs comparative statics. As in chapter 3, it examines how the changes in
the following parameters aRect the economy: changes in the precision of public information
1/2, changes in the precision of private information 1/2x, changes in the elasticity of sub-
stitution , and changes in the Kxed producing costs f . In all exercises, a unique monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium is Krst shown to exist. The numerical results for proving the unique
existence of equilibrium are not included in the text. Apart from the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix), the expected average productivity
)x (Ix), the expected mass of existing Krms M (Ix), the expected aggregate price P (Ix)
and the expected aggregate revenue R (Ix) are also included in the graph to complete the
analysis.
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4.5.1 Changes in the Precision of Public Information
Table 4.2 shows parameter values for the exercise when the precision of , 1/2 changes. 2
varies from 0.04 to 16, and the corresponding precision 1/2 varies from 0.0625 to 25. In
this range, the precision of public information  can be greater or smaller than the precision
of private information X| = , which is 1 for normal and gamma cases. Note that for
the exponential distribution case, the precision of private information 1/2x = 1/ varies
as the mean productivity  changes. The expectation of  remains unchanged and equals
2.5. When the precision of public information goes to inKnity, the game with incomplete
information degenerates to Melitz case.
Table 4.2. Parameterizations when precision of public information changes
Value
Parameters Normal Gamma Exponential
The elasticity of substitution () 3 3 3
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 0 0.01 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 5 4.99 4
Mean of the mean productivity  (	) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Variance of the mean productivity  (2) [0.04, 16] [0.04, 16] [0.04, 16]
Lower bound of productivity x (a) 0 0 0
Higher bound of productivity x (b) 5 5 5
Variance of productivity x (2x) 1 1 N/A
The entry costs (fe) 0.1 0.1 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 1 1 1
The labor endowment (L) 1 1 1
Figure 4.2 shows how the precision of public information aRects the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). The x-axis is the natural logarithm
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of precision. The y-axis is the ratio between true variable values and values for Melitz case
when  =  = 2.5.
First of all, as can be seen from Kgure 4.2, when the precision of public information
increases, the equilibrium switching point x increases to the cutoR point for Melitz model.
In addition, as precision of  increases, the expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases
as result of increasing x. The mass of entry Krm Me (Ix) increases while the ex-ante
expected probability of stay P e (Ix) decreases. By the changes through )x (Ix), Me (Ix)
and P e (Ix), the expected aggregate price P (Ix) decreases. And then the expected welfare
per worker W (Ix) increases due to the price drop. In sum, when the precision of public
information increases, the equilibrium switching point x, the expected average productivity
)x (Ix) and the expected welfare per workerW (Ix) increase. This result holds for examples
of all three distribution and replicates the results of the comparative statics related with the
precision of public information in chapter 3.
Figure 4.2.a. The eRects of precision of public information (normal distribution)
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Figure 4.2.b. The eRects of precision of public information (gamma distribution)
Figure 4.2.c. The eRects of precision of public information (exponential distribution)
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4.5.2 Changes in the Precision of Private Information
This part examines how the precision of private information aRects the equilibrium switching
point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). Table 4.3 shows the parameter
values. The variance of productivity x, 2x varies from 0.36 to 16, and the corresponding
precision 1/2x varies from 0.0625 to 2.78. In this range, the precision of private information
can be greater or smaller than the precision of public information 1/2 , which is 1. When
2x < 0.36, a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. Note that for exponential
distribution case, the precision of private information 1/2x = 1/ and varies as the mean
productivity  changes. As a result, exponential distribution case is excluded from the
comparative statics analysis here.
Table 4.3. Parameterizations when precision of X| =  changes
Value
Parameters Normal Gamma
The elasticity of substitution () 3 3
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 0 0.01
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 5 4.99
Mean of the mean productivity  (	) 2.5 2.5
Variance of the mean productivity  (2) 1 1
Lower bound of productivity x (a) 0 0
Higher bound of productivity x (b) 5 5
Variance of productivity x (2x) [0.36, 16] [0.36, 16]
The entry costs (fe) 0.1 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 1 1
The labor endowment (L) 1 1
Figure 4.3 shows how the equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per
worker W (Ix) changes with the change in precision of private information. The x-axis is
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the natural logarithm of precision of private information. And the y-axis is the ratio between
true variable values and values for standard case when 2x = 2 = 1, and then ln (1/2x) = 0.
From Kgure 4.3, it can be seen that as the precision of private information increases, move-
ments of the equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix)
for the normal distribution case and the gamma distribution case are diRerent. For the
normal distribution case, i.e., when productivity distribution is symmetric, the equilibrium
switching point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) decrease as the precision
of private information increases. This is the same result as in chapter 3 when productivity
distribution is uniform and thus is symmetric. However, for the gamma distribution case, the
equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) increase and
then decrease as the precision of private information increases. This diRerence indicates that
the shapes of productivity distribution do aRect the comparative statics result on precision
of private information. Note that as in chapter 3, the welfare per worker and the equilibrium
switching point move in the same direction: they either increase or decrease at the same
time.
Figure 4.4 shows how the precision of private information aRects the equilibrium cutoR
point x and welfare per worker W (Ix) for Melitz case when  =  = . For this exercise,
 = 2.5 and all other parameters are the same as in table 4.3. The x-axis is the precision of
private information, and the y-axis is the ratio between true variable values and values for
the case when 2x = 1.
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Figure 4.3.a. The eRects of precision of private information (normal distribution)
Figure 4.3.b. The eRects of precision of private information (gamma distribution)
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Figure 4.4.a. The eRects of precision of private information for Melitz case (normal
distribution)
Figure 4.4.b. The eRects of precision of private information for Melitz case (gamma
distribution)
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From Kgure 4.4, it can be seen that as the precision of private information increases for
the normal distribution case, the equilibrium cutoR point x decreases. For the gamma
distribution case, the equilibrium cutoR point x increases and then decreases. There are
diRerences of the eRects of changing precision of private information under symmetric dis-
tribution vis-à-vis skewed distribution, as shown in Kgure 4.3. Moreover, the standardized
welfare curve and the standardized cutoR productivity curve coincide with each other as
shown in chapter 3. Note that when the productivity is drawn from a gamma distribution,
although in some range, increasing private information precision will increase equilibrium
switching point and increase welfare, increasing the precision of public information will al-
ways increase welfare irrespective of the precision of private information. The following
exercise considers 2x = 16 (precision = 2.77), and for a small neighborhood around this
private precision level, increasing the private precision can increase the welfare as 2 changes
from 0 to 7. The x-axis is the precision of public information and the y-axis the ratio between
equilibrium values and the value for the case when 2 = 0.
Figure 4.5. The eRects of precision of public information when 2x = 16 (gamma
distribution)
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4.5.3 Changes in the Elasticity of Substitutions
Table 4.4 shows parameter setting for exercise when the elasticity of substitution  changes.
The elasticity of substitution  varies from 2 to 6 for all three distribution cases. When
 < 2, a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.
Figure 4.6 shows how the equilibrium switching point x and the expected welfare per
workerW (Ix) changes with the changes in . The x-axis is the elasticity of substitution ,
while the y-axis is the ratio between true variable values and values for the case when  = 2.
Table 4.4. Parameterizations when  changes
Value
Parameters Normal Gamma Exponential
The elasticity of substitution () [2, 6] [2, 6] [2, 6]
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 0 0.01 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 5 4.99 4
Mean of the mean productivity  (	) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Variance of the mean productivity  (2) 0.5 0.5 0.5
Lower bound of productivity x (a) 0 0 0
Higher bound of productivity x (b) 5 5 5
Variance of productivity x (2x) 1 1 N/A
The entry costs (fe) 0.1 0.1 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) 1 1 1
The labor endowment (L) 1 1 1
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Figure 4.6.a. The eRects of the elasticity of substitutions (normal distribution)
Figure 4.6.b. The eRects of the elasticity of substitutions (gamma distribution)
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Figure 4.6.c. The eRects of the elasticity of substitutions (exponential distribution)
As can be seen from Kgure 4.6, when the elasticity of substitution  increases, the equi-
librium switching point x increases since with higher level of , Krms with lower level of
productivity lose revenues further and therefore exit the market. The impact of elasticity
of substitution  on the equilibrium switching point x is the same for uniform distrib-
ution case in chapter 3 and the non-uniform distribution cases here in chapter 4. When
the equilibrium switching point x increases, the corresponding expected average produc-
tivity )x (Ix) increases as a result. At the same time, the expected mass of existing Krm
M (Ix) (= Me (Ix)P
e (Ix)) decreases. Then the welfare per worker changes due to two
eRects: the positive eRect is caused by a decrease in the expected aggregate price P (Ix)
as expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases, and the negative eRect is caused by a
decreasing of expected mass of existing Krm which oRers less variety to consumer. When the
postive eRect dominates the negative eRect, welfare per worker increases, as can be seen for
non-uniform distribution cases for   [2, 6] in chapter 4. However, in chapter 3, the welfare
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per work decreases and then increases as the negative eRect is stronger when the elasticity
of substitution is low.
4.5.4 Changes in Fixed Production Costs
Parameter values for the exercise when the Kxed producing costs f changes is shown in
table 4.5. The Kxed production cost f varies from 0.01 to 1 and thus the ratio between
the Kxed production cost f and the entry cost fe changes from 0.1 to 10. Figure 4.7 shows
how the change in Kxed production cost f aRects the equilibrium switching point x and
the expected welfare per worker W (Ix). Since the equilibrium switching point x is only
impacted by the ratio between f and fe, no comparative statics analysis is conducted for
changes in entry costs fe and the x-axis for Kgure 6 is set to be ffe instead of f . The y-axis
is the ratio between true variable values and those for the case when f = fe.
Table 4.5. Parameterizations when f changes
Value
Parameters Normal Gamma Exponential
The elasticity of substitution () 3 3 3
Lower bound of the mean productivity  () 0 0.01 1
Higher bound of the mean productivity  () 5 4.99 4
Mean of the mean productivity  (	) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Variance of the mean productivity  (2) 0.5 0.5 0.5
Lower bound of productivity x (a) 0 0 0
Higher bound of productivity x (b) 5 5 5
Variance of productivity x (2x) 1 1 N/A
The entry costs (fe) 0.1 0.1 0.1
The Kxed producing costs (f) [0.01, 1] [0.01, 1] [0.01, 1]
The labor endowment (L) 1 1 1
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From Kgure 4.7 it can be seen that when the Kxed producing cost f increases, the equilib-
rium switching point x increases and the expected welfare per worker W (Ix) decreases.
The increasing of x is caused by the decrease of the expected proKts since f increases.
Although the expected average productivity )x (Ix) increases, the expected aggregate price
P (Ix) increases since the impact of the expected mass of existing KrmM (Ix) on P (Ix)
dominates the impact of )x (Ix) on P (Ix). As a result, the corresponding expected wel-
fare per worker W (Ix) decreases as Kxed producing costs f increases. The result for this
exercise is the same as the one for chapter 3.
Figure 4.7.a. The eRects of the Kxed producing costs (normal distribution)
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Figure 4.7.b. The eRects of the Kxed producing costs (gamma distribution)
Figure 4.7.c. The eRects of the Kxed producing costs (exponential distribution)
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter generalizes the analysis undertaken in chapter 3 with more general distributions.
It veriKes that (1) a unique monotonic pure strategy equilibrium exists in a global game with
incomplete information; (2) with more precise public information, the aggregate productivity
and the welfare increase. However, some results depend on the shape of the distribution. In
chapter 3, with more precise private information, the aggregate productivity and the welfare
decrease monotonically. Here in chapter 4, when the conditional productivity is drawn from
normal distribution, the same result prevails. However, when the conditional productivity
is drawn from gamma distribution, which is skewed, the response of aggregate productivity
and the welfare to an increase in the precision of private information is non-monotonic: It
Krst increases and then begins to decrease. The precision of private information however
has less to do with the information asymmetry and more to do with the ex-post dispersion
of Krms’ productivity. The response of welfare and aggregate productivity with respect to
the precision of productivity distribution essentially follows from Melitz’s (2003) model with
complete information.
In chapter 4, individual Krm’s productivity X| =  is drawn from truncated normal,
truncated gamma, and truncated exponential distributions. While in chapter 3, X| =
 is drawn from a uniform distribution. Since the monotonic pure strategy equilibrium
unique exists for cases in chapter 3 and chapter 4, it can be concluded that the shapes of
conditional productivity distributions does not preclude the existence of a unique monotonic
pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, because the aggregate productivity and the welfare
increases with more precise public information for all cases in chapter 3 and chapter 4,
a clear conclusion can be drawn that an increase in the precision of public information
invariably makes the economy better oR, and this result is independent of the dispersion of
Krms’ productivities.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This dissertation discusses two topics: business cycles with asset Kre sales and Krm entry and
exit dynamics in global games with incomplete information. For both topics, the key focus
is to identify policies and/or information structure that can improve welfare. In the second
chapter, a capital requirement policy can increase welfare in the long run, and in chapter 3
and chapter 4, more precise public information can increase both the aggregate productivity
and the welfare per worker.
Since all the three chapters undertake theoretical exercises, corresponding models need
to be empirically calibrated before any policy advice can be conclusively oRered. In chapter
2, for example, whether there is over-borrowing from the second best point of view in the
economy depends on the equilibrium types and thus without calibration one cannot conclude
that the optimal capital control policy can always strictly increase welfare. It is possible that
the equilibrium type is such that any binding capital control policy will reduce welfare and
thus hurt the economy.
Chapter 4 generalizes the study in chapter 3 on Krm entry and exit dynamics in global
games with more complicated distributions. The assumption that mean productivity is
drawn from a (truncated) normal distribution is more realistic due to the central limit
theorem. Furthermore, whether the conditional productivity distribution when the mean
is given is symmetric such as normal distribution, or skewed like gamma or exponential
distribution, can only be examined by calibrating to the Krm-level productivity data. If
the theoretical models developed in this dissertation can be linked to empirical studies, the
conclusions will be more valuable for policy advice. This is left for future research.
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX
A.1 The Timeline for Generation t
Figure A.1. The timeline for generation t
A.2 Equivalence of Multi-period Financial Contract and
Single-period Contracts
Consider the entrepreneur’s problem with two single period contracts

ze,tt , z
e,t
t (s)
	
and

xe,tt (s) , x
e,t
t+1(s)
	
. The contract

ze,tt , z
e,t
t (s)
	
speciKes a loan ze,tt from the consumer to the
entrepreneur before entrepreneur’s period t production, and then state-contingent payments
ze,tt (s) from the entrepreneur to the consumer after production. The contract

xe,tt (s) , x
e,t
t+1(s)
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characterizes a loan xe,tt (s) from the consumer to the entrepreneur at the end of period t
and repayments xe,tt+1(s) from the entrepreneur to the consumer after entrepreneur’s period
t+ 1 production.
Given wage levels {wt, wt+1(s)} and capital prices {qt(s)}, the entrepreneur’s individual
problem is to maximize her expected utility
$
sce,tt+1(s) by choosing the Krst Knancial con-
tract

ze,tt , z
e,t
t (s)
	
at the beginning of period t, the second Knancial contract

xe,tt (s) , x
e,t
t+1(s)
	
at the end of period t, investment decisions

ke,tt , {t(s), ke,tt+1(s)}
	
, labor demands {Le,tt+1(s)}
and consumption levels {ce,tt+1(s)}. As the case with multi-period contract, the entrepre-
neur faces four sets of constraints: the resource constraints, the consumer’s participation
constraints, the no-default constraints, and the capital requirement constraint. The capital
requirement constraint here is exactly same as (2.11) by deKnition. The Krst three sets of
constraints are introduced below.
The resource constraints are:
ke,tt  wtLe,t + ze,tt (A.1)
qt(s)(k
e,t
t+1(s) t(s)k
e,t
t )  at(s)ke,tt  t(s)k
e,t
t  ze,tt (s) + xe,tt (s) (A.2)
ce,tt+1(s)  AF (k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s) x
e,t
t+1(s) (A.3)
Since the entrepreneur oRers two contracts, she needs to make the consumer accept both
of them. Consumer’s expected utility when accepts the Krst contract

ze,tt , z
e,t
t (s)
	
without
considering the second contract is
&
s

wtL
c,t  ze,tt + ze,tt (s) qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) + Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s))

and the utility when the contract is rejected is
&
s

wtL
c,t  qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) + Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s))

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Then, the consumer’s participation constraint for the Krst contract is given by
ze,tt 
&
sze,tt (s) (A.4)
At the end of period t, because there is no uncertainty, the consumer accepts the second
contract when
xe,tt (s)  xe,tt+1(s) (A.5)
If she accepts the two contracts, the consumption for each period is
cc,tt (s) = wtL
c,t  ze,tt + ze,tt (s) xe,tt (s) qt(s)kc,tt+1(s) (A.6)
cc,tt+1(s) = Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) + x
e,t
t+1(s) (A.7)
Assume that cc,tt (s)  0 and cc,tt+1(s)  0 for s = l, h. The consumer’s participation
constraints are (A.4) and (A.5).
The no-default constraints for the entrepreneur are:
ze,tt (s)  (at(s) + max{qt(s) , 0}) ke,tt (A.8)
xe,tt+1(s)  

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

(A.9)
and the no-default constraints for the consumer are:
ze,tt (s)  0 (A.10)
xe,tt+1(s)  0 (A.11)
Call individuals’ problems (the entrepreneur’s problem and the consumer’s problem) with
multi-period contract

de,tt , d
e,t
t (s), d
e,t
t+1(s)
	
problem 1, and individuals’ problems with two
single period contracts

ze,tt , z
e,t
t (s)
	
and

xe,tt (s) , x
e,t
t+1(s)
	
problem 2. Now, show the equiv-
alence of problem 1 and problem 2. First consider the entrepreneur’s problem in problem
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2. Since the utility function is strictly increasing with ce,tt+1(s) and the entrepreneur is the
creator of contracts, by (A.5), xe,tt+1(s) = x
e,t
t (s). DeKne the following variables
de,tt = z
e,t
t
de,tt+1(s) = x
e,t
t+1(s)
de,tt (s) = z
e,t
t (s) xe,tt (s) = ze,tt (s) xe,tt+1(s) = z
e,t
t (s) de,tt+1(s)
Then the resource constraints (A.1)-(A.3) in problem 2 can be rewritten as the resource
constraints (2.5)-(2.7) in problem 1, the consumer’s participation constraints (A.4) and (A.5)
can be summarized as one single constraint (2.10), and the no-default constraints (A.8)-
(A.11) in problem 2 can be simpliKed as (2.1)-(2.4) in problem 1. Moreover, because the
per-period consumption in problem 2 (equations (A.6) and (A.7)) can be written as the con-
sumption in equations (2.8) and (2.9) in problem 1, the non-negative consumption conditions
are the same for the two problems. In sum, with the same constraints and the same objective
function, the entrepreneur’s problem in problem 1 and problem 2 are identical. In addition,
since the entrepreneur always makes the consumer accept contracts, the consumer’s problem
in problem 1 and problem 2 are identical as well. That is, individuals’ problems are identical
irrespective of the length of the contract.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.1
By (2.14) and strictly increasing of entrepreneur’s utility function, the entrepreneur’s problem
can be rewritten as
max
&
s
s

" 
AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)


AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)


#!
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such that
wtL
e,t  ke,tt  0
wtL
e,t + hbe,tt (h)ke,tt + lbe,tt (l)ke,tt  ke,tt  0
" 
at(s)k
e,t
t + qt(s)k
e,t
t  ke,tt  be,tt (s)ke,tt
+

AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

 qt(s)ke,tt+1(s)

#!  0
(at(s) + qt(s) ) be,tt (s)  0
be,tt (s)  0
where
be,tt (s) =
de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)
ke,tt
is the net present value of promised repayments per unit of capital.
The constraint set is non-empty and compact, and then a solution exists. Moreover, the
solution of the above problem is the solution of the original entrepreneur’s problem.
L = h

" 
AF (ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h)) wt+1(h)L
e,t
t+1(h)


AF (ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h)) wt+1(h)L
e,t
t+1(h)


#!
+l

" 
AF (ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l)) wt+1(l)L
e,t
t+1(l)


AF (ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l)) wt+1(l)L
e,t
t+1(l)


#!
+g

wtL
e,t  ke,tt

+ z0

wtL
e,t + hbe,tt (h)ke,tt + lbe,tt (l)ke,tt    ke,tt

+hz1h

" 
ahk
e,t
t + qt(h)k
e,t
t  ke,tt  be,tt (h)ke,tt
+

AF (ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h)) wt+1(h)L
e,t
t+1(h)

 qt(h)ke,tt+1(h)

#!
+lz1l

" 
alk
e,t
t + qt(l)k
e,t
t  ke,tt  be,tt (l)ke,tt
+

AF (ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l)) wt+1(l)L
e,t
t+1(l)

 qt(l)ke,tt+1(l)

#!
+1

(ah + qt(h) ) be,tt (h)

+ 2be,tt (h)
+3

(al + qt(l) ) be,tt (l)

+ 4be,tt (l)
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Then, the Krst order conditions are:
L
ke,tt
=

"""" 
g  z0

1 hbe,tt (h) lbe,tt (l)

+hz1h

ah + qt(h)   be,tt (h)

+lz1l

al + qt(l)   be,tt (l)


####!
 0 (A.12)
L
ke,tt+1(h)
=

" 
h (1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h))
hz1h

qt(h) F1(ke,tt+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h))


#!  0 (A.13)
L
ke,tt+1(l)
=

" 
l (1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l))
lz1l

qt(l) F1(ke,tt+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l))


#!  0 (A.14)
L
be,tt (h)
= z0hke,tt  hz1hke,tt  1 + 2  0 (A.15)
L
be,tt (l)
= z0lke,tt  lz1lke,tt  3 + 4  0 (A.16)
L
Le,tt+1(h)
= h (1 )

AF2(k
e,t
t+1(h), L
e,t
t+1(h)) wt+1(h)

 0 (A.17)
L
Le,tt+1(l)
= l (1 )

AF2(k
e,t
t+1(l), L
e,t
t+1(l)) wt+1(l)

 0 (A.18)
By (A.17) and (A.18),
wt+1(s) = AF2(k
e,t
t+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)
By (A.15) and (A.16),
If z0ske,tt  sz1ske,tt < 0, then be,tt (s) = 0
If z0ske,tt  sz1ske,tt = 0, then be,tt (s)  [0, (at (s) + qt(s) )]
If z0ske,tt  sz1ske,tt > 0, then be,tt (s) = (at (s) + qt(s) )
By (A.13), (A.14) and ke,tt+1(s) > 0, one gets
z1s =
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
qt(s) AF1(ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s))
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By (A.12) and ke,tt > 0, when the capital requirment constraint does not bind,
z0 =
$
s sz1s

at (s) + qt(s)  

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

/ke,tt

1
$
s s

de,tt (s) + d
e,t
t+1(s)

/ke,tt
The above proves the Krst part of lemma 2.1. Now consider the case when the capital
requirement constraint binds. With binding capital requirement constraint,
ke,tt =
1
wtL
e,t
and
de,tt () = ke,tt  wtLe,t =

1
  1

wtL
e,t
Since z1l > z1h, the entrepreneur will exhaust her borrowing in good state Krst before
she can borrow against bad state. That is, if de,tt ()  h (ah + qt(h) ) ke,tt , the entre-
preneur only repays in good state and de,tt (h) + d
e,t
t+1(h) = d
e,t
t ()/h, de,tt (l) + de,tt+1 (l) = 0.
If de,tt () > h (ah + qt(h) ) ke,tt , the entrepreneur also repays in bad state since the
marginal return of investment is pretty hgih. In this case, the repayment limit in good
state binds (de,tt (h) + d
e,t
t+1(h) = (ah + qt(h) ) k
e,t
t ), and the entrepreneur repays the
rest in bad state, de,tt (l) + d
e,t
t+1 (l) =
1
l

de,tt () h (ah + 1 ) ke,tt

. The entrepreneur
still maximizes her borrowing ability in the last period because z1s > 1. Thus, d
e,t
t+1(s) =


AF (ke,tt+1(s), L
e,t
t+1(s)) wt+1(s)L
e,t
t+1(s)

.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The characterization part is proved Krst and then the existence and uniqueness are shown.
A.4.1 The Characterization
By assumption 2.3, Kre sales occur if and only if there is a bad productivity shock. That is,
qt(l) < 1 and qt(h) = 1. When solving the individuals’ problems, it is already showed that
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z1h < z1l. Therefore, if the capital requirement constraint is not binding, one of the following
three cases applies (1) z0  z1h < z1l, (2) z1h < z0 < z1l, and (3) z1h < z1l  z0. Applying
the Krst part in lemma 2.1, these three cases give the equilibrium Knancial contracts of types
1-3. When the capital requirement constraint binds, it is still true that z1h < z1l. Although
z0() = z0, entrepreneurs still borrow Krst against good state before they can borrow against
bad state. Thus, the above three cases hold irrespective of the policy control.
A.4.2 The Existence and Uniqueness
Here a new variable  is introduced as the ratio of outside borrowing to total capital invested
at the beginning of period t. The existence and uniqueness of CE are Krstly proved and
then the existence and uniqueness of the corresponding competitive equilibrium are shown
thereafter. In a competitive equilibrium with binding capital requirement, CE = 1   by
deKnition and thus is unique. If the capital requirement constraint does not bind, CE can
be chosen from [0, ]. The following step 1 and step 2 are combined together to show that
CE exists and is unique if the capital requirement constraint does not bind.
The existence and uniqueness of CE Step 1. To show that the equilibrium capital
price in bad state qt(l) is a continuous and decreasing function with .
With  chosen,
de,tt = ke,tt
By (2.20),
ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l) = 
1
qt(l)

(al  ) ke,tt  de,tt (l)

and then by (2.14) and labor market clear condition (2.23),
ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l) = 
1
qt(l)

(al  ) ke,tt  A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1

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Moreover, by capital market clear condition,
ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l) = 
1
F c(k
e,t
t  ke,tt+1 (l))

(al  ) ke,tt  A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1

Now, set
H = F c(k
e,t
t  ke,tt+1 (l))

ke,tt  ke,tt+1 (l)

+

(al  ) ke,tt  A

ke,tt+1(l)

L1

= 0
Assume the production function in riskless sector is
Fc(k
c,t
t+1(s)) = k
c,t
t+1(s)m

kc,tt+1(s)
2
Then H can be written as
H = kc,tt+1(l)

1 2mkc,tt+1(l)

+

(al  ) ke,tt  A

ke,tt  kc,tt+1(l)

L1

and
H
kc,tt+1(l)
= 1 4mkc,tt+1(l) + 2A

ke,tt  kc,tt+1(l)
1
L1 > 0
H
ke,tt
= (al  ) 2A

ke,tt  kc,tt+1(l)
1
L1 < 0
By implicit function theorem,
kc,tt+1(s)
ke,tt
=  H/k
e,t
t
H/kc,tt+1(s)
> 0
which implies
qt(l)
 < 0
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since
F c(k
c,t
t+1(s)) = 1 2mk
c,t
t+1(s) = qt(l)
ke,tt =
1
1 wtL
e,t
That is, the equilibrium capital price in bad state qt(l) is a continuous and decreasing
function with  for   [0, ].
DeKne qt(l) = ft () for future use. By the characterization, the equilibrium Knancial
contract takes the form:
be,tt+1 (l) =
1
l
max { (, 0} (A.19)
be,tt+1 (h) =
1
h
min {,(}
where
( = h (ah + 1 )
Step 2. To show the existence and uniqueness of CE when the capital requirement
constraint does not bind.
DeKne a function  : [0, ]
 R as following:
 () =



z0  z1h, if   [0,(]
z0  z1l, if   ((, ]
The function  () is continuous and diRerentiable except at (. Now, it is time to show that
 () is a decreasing function with .
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When   [0,(),
 () = z0  z1h
=

" 

s sz1s(at(s)+qt(s)(d
e,t
t (s)+d
e,t
t+1(s))/k
e,t
t )
1

s s(d
e,t
t (s)+d
e,t
t+1(s))/k
e,t
t
 (1)AF1(k
e,t
t+1(h),L)
1AF1(ke,tt+1(h),L)

#!
=

" 
hz1h

at(h)+1 h

+lz1l(at(l)+ft(	))
1

s sb
e,t
t (s)
 (1)AF1(k
e,t
t+1(h),L)
1AF1(ke,tt+1(h),L)

#!
And then,
 ()
 =
1
1
$
s sb
e,t
t (s)
(z1h + lz1lf t()) < 0
When   ((, ],
 () = z0  z1l
=

" 

s sz1s(at(s)+qt(s)(d
e,t
t (s)+d
e,t
t+1(s))/k
e,t
t )
1

s s(d
e,t
t (s)+d
e,t
t+1(s))/k
e,t
t
 (1)AF1(k
e,t
t+1(l),L)
qt(l)AF1(ke,tt+1(l),L)

#!
=

" 
hz1h

at(h)+1 h

+lz1l

at(l)+ft(	) l

1

s sb
e,t
t (s)
 (1)AF1(k
e,t
t+1(h),L)
ft(	)AF1(ke,tt+1(h),L)

#!
Thus,
 ()
 =
lz1l
1
$
s sb
e,t
t (s)

f t()
1
l

+
(1 )AF1(ke,tt+1(h), L)
ft() AF1(ke,tt+1(h), L)
2f t() < 0
In addition,  (() > lim		+  () since z1h < z1l. In other words,  () is a continuous
and decreasing function of  except at (, where it has a downward jump. This implies that
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there exists one and only one CE  [0, ] that satisKes one of the following conditions:
1. CE = 0, 

CE

 0 where zCE0  zCE1h < zCE1l ;
2. CE  (0,(), 

CE

= 0 where zCE0 = z
CE
1h < z
CE
1l ;
3. CE = (,  (()  0  lim		+  (() where zCE1h < zCE0 < zCE1l ;
4. CE  ((, ), 

CE

= 0 where zCE1h < z
CE
0 = z
CE
1l ;
5. CE = , 

CE

 0 where zCE1h < zCE1l  zCE0 .
The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium For each of above Kve cases, it is possible
to Knd out an equilibrium with CE. Given CE, the Krst time investment and the borrowing
are
ke,tt =
1
1 CEwtL
e,t
de,tt =
CE
1 CEwtL
e,t
Following step 1 in above section,
qCEt (l) = ft

CE

and by capital market clear, ke,t,CEt+1 (l) can be found by solving
F c(k
e,t,CE
t  ke,t,CEt+1 (l)) = qCEt (l)
and then by (A.19), the repayments in bad state are
de,t,CEt+1 (l) = A


ke,t,CEt+1 (l)

L1
de,t,CEt (l) =
1
l
max

CE  (, 0

ke,tt  de,t,CEt+1 (l)
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Now, consider the repayments in good state.
ke,t,CEt+1 (h) = (ah + 1 ) k
e,t,CE
t  de,t,CEt (h)
where
de,t,CEt (h) = b
e,t,CE
t (h)k
e,t,CE
t  de,t,CEt+1 (h)
=
1
h
min

CE,(

ke,t,CEt  A


ke,t,CEt+1 (h)

L1
DeKne
J = ke,t,CEt+1 (h) A


ke,t,CEt+1 (h)

L1  (ah + 1 ) ke,t,CEt +
1
h
min

CE,(

ke,t,CEt
and J is an increasing function with ke,t,CEt+1 (h) by assumption 2.2. With assumption 2.4,
J

ke,tt+1 (h)

= 0 has an unique solution ke,t,CEt+1 (h) such that k
e,t,CE
t+1 (h)  k
e,t,CE
t . And thus,
the CE can be used to Knd out an unique equilibrium.
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A.5 Dynamics with t = 101 to 1000
A.5.1 Type 1 Equilibrium
Figure A.2. Dynamics of type 1 equilibrium (t = 101 to 1000)
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A.5.2 Type 3 Equilibrium
Figure A.3. Dynamics of type 3 equilibrium (t = 101 to 1000)
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APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
B.1 The Consumer’s Problem
First show that the demand q() of good  and the price P of the aggregate good Q( U),
satisfy equations (3.1) and (3.3).
DeKne Y =
%
 q ()
	 d so that Q = Y 1/	. The demand of good  is determined by
equating the market price p () to the marginal beneKt of buying the good:
p () = PY 1/	1q ()	1 (B.1)
Solving for q ():
q () =

p ()1 PY 1/	1
 1
1 = p ()
1
1 P
1
1Y 1/	 = p ()
1
1 P
1
1Q
which gives equation (3.1). Moreover, from this equation one also obtains (after multiplying
by p () and integrating):
'

p () q () d = P
1
1Q
'

p ()1
 d (B.2)
Note also from (B.1), that
'

p () q () d =
'

PY 1/	1q ()	 d = PY 1/	1
'

q ()	 d
= PY 1/	 = PQ
121
Equating this result to (B.2) it follows that
P
1
1Q
'

p ()1
 d = PQ
and solving for P results in the equation (3.3).
Then, the expenditure of good  is
r () = p () q () = p ()Q

p ()
P


= PQ

p ()
P
1

= R

p ()
P
1

where R = PQ =
%
 r () d denotes aggregate expenditure.
B.2 The Producer’s Problem
The producer which produces good  with productivity level xi is a monopoly in good 
market, and the demand it faces is
q () = Q

p ()
P


Then, the producer’s problem is
max
p()
q () p ()

f +
q ()
xi

w = Q

p ()
P


p ()

" f +
Q


p()
P


xi

#!w
where w is the wage rate.
The F.O.C is
Q

1
P


(1 ) (p ())
 + Q 1
xi

1
P


(p ())
1w = 0
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Solve the Krst order condition and then get
p () =   1
w
xi
=
w
xi
The S.O.C is
Q

1
P


(1 ) (p ())
1 + (  1)Q 1
xi

1
P


(p ())
2w < 0
Since each Krm produces diRerent good and Krm sets price based on its own productivity
level,
p (xi) = p () =
w
xi
The optimal quantity is then
q () = q (xi) = Q

p (xi)
P


= Q

w
Pxi


= Q (Pxi)

The last equality holds since the wage ratio is normalized to 1. And Krm’s revenue is
r (xi) = q (xi) p (xi) = Q (Pxi)

1
xi
= (PQ)P 
1 (xi)
1 = R (Pxi)
1
The labor used for producing is
lp (xi) = f +
q (xi)
xi
= f +Q (Pxi)

1
xi
= f + r (xi) = f +
  1
 R (Pxi)

1
and thus the proKt of the Krm is
(xi) = r(xi) lp (xi) =
R
 (Pxi)

1  f
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B.3 Aggregation
Here are the derivation of aggregate variables.
P =
' 
0
p (x)1
M	(x)dx
 1
1
=M
1
1
' 
0

1
x
1

	(x)dx
 1
1
= M
1
1
1

' 
0
x
1	(x)dx
 1
1
=M
1
1 p ()x)
Q =
' 
0
q (x)	M	(x)dx
1/	
=
' 
0
q ()x)	

x
)x

	
M	(x)dx
1/	
= M1/	q ()x)

1
)x

 ' 
0
(x)
	 	(x)dx
 
1
=M1/	q ()x)
R = PQ =
' 
0
r (x)M	(x)dx =
' 
0
r ()x)

x
)x

1
M	(x)dx
= Mr ()x)

1
)x

1' 
0
x
1	(x)dx
1
1
=Mr ()x)
 =
' 
0
 (x)M	(x)dx = 1
' 
0
r (x)M	(x)dxMf
= M

r ()x)
  f

=M ()x)
B.4 Posterior Distribution of 
Now consider the probability density function of  when Xi = xi where    < xi <  + 
Krst.
f|Xi=xi () =
fXi, (xi, )
fXi (xi)
(B.3)
=
fXi, (xi, )%
 fXi, (xi, ) d
=
fXi|= (xi) f ( = )%
 fXi|= (xi) f ( = ) d
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where the probability density function f ( = ) is
f ( = ) =



1
 if     
0 otherwise
and the conditional probability density function fXi|= (xi) is
fXi|= (xi) =



1
2 if     xi   + 
0 otherwise
since Xi| ( = ) =  +i where i  U [, ].
DeKne set A as
A = {|f ( = ) > 0 and fXi|= (xi) > 0}
= {| (xi)     (xi)}
where
 (xi) = max {xi  , }
 (xi) = min

xi + , 

Note that since    < xi <  + ,  (xi) =  (xi).
Then,
fXi (xi) =
' 

fXi|= (xi) f ( = ) d
=
'
A
fXi|= (xi) f ( = ) d
=
' (xi)
(xi)
1
2
1
  
d
=
1
2
1
  

 (xi)  (xi)

(B.4)
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Thus, when   A ( (xi)     (xi)), from (B.4), the conditional density function
(B.3) can be simpliKed as
f|Xi=xi () =
1
2
1

fXi (xi)
=
1
2
1

1
2
1


 (xi)  (xi)
 = 1
 (xi)  (xi)
and when  / A ( <  (xi) or  >  (xi)),
f|Xi=xi () =
0
fXi (xi)
= 0
In sum, the posterior distribution J|Xi=xi() of  conditional on xi is U

 (xi) ,  (xi)

when    < xi <  + .
When Xi = xi =   , Krm i knows that the only possible realization of  is  because
if  =  > , Xi| =      >   . That is, the posterior distribution J|Xi=xi() of 
conditional on Xi =   is  =  for probability of 1. Similarly, when Xi = xi = + , the
posterior distribution J|Xi=xi() of  conditional on xi is  =  for probability of 1.
B.5 Expressions with Threshold Strategy
B.5.1 Labor Market Clear Condition
L = Mefe +R (Pr(X), )  (Pr(X), )
= Mefe +M (Pr(X), ) r ()x) (Pr(X), )M (Pr(X), )  ()x) (Pr(X), )
= Mefe +M (Pr(X), ) ((  1)  ()x) (Pr(X), ) + f)
= Mefe +M (Pr(X), ) ((  1)  (Pr(X), ) + f)
= Mefe +MePstay (Pr(X), ) ((  1) (Pr(X), ) + f)
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B.5.2 Average ProAt
From labor market clear condition (3.30) obtain
Pstay (Ix , )  (Ix , ) =
L
Me
 fe  Pstay (Ix , )f
  1
Now use the above in free entry condition (3.31) to obtain
Me (x
) =
L/
fe +
f

% 
 Pstay (Ix , ) d
=
L/
fe + fP estay (Ix)
(B.5)
Substituting (B.5) in (3.30) now gives the average proKts
 (Ix , ) =
1
Pstay (Ix , )
1
  1



fe + fP
e
stay (Ix)

 fe  Pstay (Ix , )f

=
1
Pstay (Ix , )
1
  1

(  1) fe + f

P estay (Ix) Pstay (Ix , )

=
f
  1

P estay (Ix)
Pstay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
Pstay (Ix , )
B.5.3 Ex-ante Probability of Staying
The ex-ante probability of staying given Ix :
P estay (Ix) = E (Pstay (Ix , ))
=
' 

1
  
Pstay (Ix , ) d
=
1
  
' 

Pstay (Ix , ) d 
' 

Pstay (Ix , ) d

where
' 

Pstay (Ix , ) d =



0 if   x  
(+x)2
4 if x
   <   x + 
  x if  > x + 
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Thus,
P estay (Ix) =



0 if   x  
1

(+x)
2
4 if x
   <   x +  and   x  
= P e1stay (Ix) =
++22x
4 if x
   <   x +  and x   <   x + 
1


  x

if  > x +  and   x  
= P e2stay (Ix) =
1



  x  (+x
)2
4

if  > x +  and x   <   x + 
= P e3stay (Ix) = 1 if  > x +  and  > x + 
B.5.4 Productivity Ratios
From (3.28) and (3.29), when     x <  + , the average productivity is
)x (Ix , ) =
' +

(xi)

1 	(xi, Ix , )dxi
 1
1
=

1
 +  x
' +
x
(xi)

1 dxi
 1
1
=

1
 +  x

1
 ( + )

  1 (x
)

 1
1
=

1
 ( +  x) (( + )

  (x)
)
 1
1
(B.6)
and when x <   , then average productivity is
)x (Ix , ) =
' +

(xi)

1 	(xi, Ix , )dxi
 1
1
=

1
2
' +

(xi)

1 dxi
 1
1
=

1
2

1
 ( + )

  1 (  )


 1
1
=

1
2 (( + )

  (  )
)
 1
1
(B.7)
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Then, the productivity ratio is

xi
)x (Ix , )

1
=



Ra1 (xi, Ix , ) = (xi)
1 
(+x
)
(+)(x) if     x
 <  + 
Ra2 (xi, Ix , ) = (xi)
1 2
(+)() if x
 <   
B.6 Proof of Lemma 3.1
This section shows that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0 for  < x <  < +. Note that assumption
3.2 assumes  > 3.
DeKne
A (x, ) = 1
 (x)  (x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f)
when    < xi <  + . Thus, within each diRerentiable region,
d
dx
u(x, Ix)
=
d
dx
' (x)
(x)
A (x, ) d  f

=
d
dx
' (x)
(x)
A (x, ) d
= A

x,  (x)
 d
dx
 (x) A (x,  (x)) d
dx
 (x) +
' (x)
(x)
d
dx
A (x, ) d (B.8)
Since
   < x <    <  + 
then,
x   <     x +  < 
and thus the integration bounds are
 (x) = 
 (x) = x + 
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The productivity ratios is

x
)x (Ix , )

1
= Ra1 (x, Ix , )
and the probability of staying and the ex ante probability of staying are respectively,
Pstay (Ix , ) = P 1stay (Ix , )
P estay (Ix) = P
e2
stay (Ix)
As a result, (B.8) can be simpliKed as
d
dx
u(x, Ix) = A (x
, x + ) +
' x+

d
dx
A (x, ) d (B.9)
where
A (x, ) = 1
x +  Ra
1 (x, Ix , )

f
  1

P e2stay (Ix)
P 1stay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
P 1stay (Ix , )
+ f

(B.10)
To show that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0, try to prove thatA (x, x + ) > 0 and
% x+

d
dxA (x
, ) d >
0 for (B.9).
Step 1. Consider A (x, x + ).
From (B.10),
A (x, x + ) = 1
x +  Ra
1 (x, Ix , x
 + ) (( (Ix , x + ) + f))
Since    < x, 1
x+ > 0. Moreover, by deKnition, Ra
1 (x, Ix , x
 + ) is the ratio
between two productivity levels, and thus is positive. Note that from producer’s problem,
( (Ix , x + ) + f) =
1
 r (Ix
 , x + )
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Because r (Ix , x + ) is the average revenue which is positive, ( (Ix , x + ) + f) > 0.
Thus, A (x, x + ) > 0.
Step 2. Consider
% x+

d
dxA (x
, ) d.
DeKne
A11 (x, ) = 1
x +  Ra
1 (x, Ix , )
=
1
x
(x)
1
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)
 = (x
)
2
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)
 > 0
A12 (x, ) =

f
  1

P e2stay (Ix)
P 1stay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
P 1stay (Ix , )
+ f

=

 f
  1

 
1



  x  (+x
)2
4


2 +
x
2
 1

!+ fe
2 +
x
2
+ f

! > 0
then
d
dx
A (x, ) = d
dx

A11 (x, )A12 (x, )

(B.11)
= A12 (x, ) d
dx
A11 (x, ) + A11 (x, ) d
dx
A12 (x, )
and thus
' x+

d
dx
A (x, ) d =
' x+

A12 (x, ) d
dx
A11 (x, ) d+
' x+

A11 (x, ) d
dx
A12 (x, ) d
Now, it is going to show that
% x+
 A
12 (x, ) d
dxA
11 (x, ) d > 0 and that
% x+
 A
11 (x, ) d
dxA
12 (x, ) d > 0.
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Step 2.1. Show that
% x+
 A
12 (x, ) d
dxA
11 (x, ) d > 0.
d
dx
A11 (x, )
=
d
dx

(x)
2
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


=
(x)
3
(( + )
  (x)
)2

 (x)
+1 + 2 (x)
 ( + ) + (1 ) (x) ( + )
 + (  2) ( + )
+1

=
(x)
3
(( + )
  (x)
)2
1
( + )
+1



x
 + 

+1
+ 2

x
 + 


+ (1 )

x
 + 

+ (  2)

DeKne
F 11 (m) = m
+1 + 2m
 + (1 )m+ (  2)
where
m =
x
 +   (0, 1)
and then
d
dm
F 11 (m) = 2m
1 m
   m
 + 1
d
dm
d
dm
F 11 (m) = m
2 (m 2 +m + 2)
When  > 3,
m 2 +m + 2 =  (m 2) +m+ 2 < 3(m 2) +m+ 2 = 4m 4 < 0
then d
dm
d
dm
F 11 (m) > 0 and
d
dm
F 11 (m) <
d
dm
F 11 (m = 1) = 2  1    + 1 = 0
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As a result,
F 11 (m) > F 11 (m = 1) = 1 + 2 + (1 ) + (  2) = 0
Thus, d
dxA
11 (x, ) > 0 and then
% x+
 A
12 (x, ) d
dxA
11 (x, ) d > 0.
Step 2.2. Show that
% x+
 A
11 (x, ) d
dxA
12 (x, ) d > 0.
With assumption 3.1 that  = , A12 (x, ) can be simpliKed as
A12 (x, ) = 1
2
f
  1
1
  
 (x)2 + 4  (2)2
 +  x +
2fe
 +  x 
f
  1
and
d
dx

1
 +  x

=
1
( +  x)2
> 0
d
dx

 (x)2 + 4  (2)2
 +  x

=  1
(  x + )2

 (x)2 + 2 (x) + 2 (x) + 42  4

=
1
(  x + )2

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

Then,
' x+

A11 (x, ) d
dx
A12 (x, ) d
=
' x+

A11 (x, )

1
2
f
  1
1
  
1
(  x + )2

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
+
' x+

A11 (x, )

1
( +  x)2

d
It is easy to see that the second term is positive. Consider the Krst term now.
133
• Rewrite the Krst term as following
' x+

A11 (x, )

1
2
f
  1
1
  
1
(  x + )2

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
=
1
2
2f
  1
(x)
2
  
' x+

( +  x)
( + )
  (x)

1
(  x + )2

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
=
1
2
2f
  1
(x)
2
  
' x+

1
( + )
  (x)

1
(  x + )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
DeKne
F 12 (x, ) = 1
( + )
  (x)

1
(  x + ) > 0
and then
d
dF
12 (x, ) = 1
(( + )
  (x)
)2 (  x + )2

(x)
 + x ( + )
1  ( + )
 (1 + )

Since
(x)
+x ( + )
1( + )
 (1 + ) < ( + )
+( + )  ( + )
1( + )
 (1 + ) = 0
d
dF
12 (x, ) < 0
• Now consider (x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4.
DeKne  as the value of  such that
(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4 = 0
And then (x)22 (x) ( + )42+4 > 0 when  < , while (x)22 (x) ( + )
42 + 4 < 0 when  > .
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DeKne
A13 (x) =
' x+

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
If   , (x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4 < 0,
F 12 (x, ) < F 12 (x, )
 F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

> F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

then,
A13 (x) >
' x+

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
= F 12 (x, )
' x+


(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
where
' x+


(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
=
' x+

2x +

(x)2  2x 42 + 4

d
=

x2 +

(x)2  2x 42 + 4


 |x+
= x

(x + )2  2

+

(x)2  2x 42 + 4

(x +  )
=  (x)3  2 (x)2 + (x)3  2 (x)2  42 (x) + 4 (x)
= 4x

   x

since x <   ,

   x

> 0
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Thus, ' x+


(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d > 0 (B.12)
and A13 (x) > 0 for   .
If  <   x + , for  <  < , (x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4 > 0,
F 12 (x, ) > F 12 (x, )
 F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

> F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

and for  <   x + , (x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4 < 0,
F 12 (x, ) < F 12 (x, )
 F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

> F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

then,
A13 (x) =
' 

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
+
' x+

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d

' 

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
+
' x+

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
= F 12 (x, )
' x+


(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d
From (B.12) and F 12 (x, ) > 0, A13 (x) > 0 when  <   x + .
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If  > x + , (x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4 > 0,
A13 (x) =
' x+

F 12 (x, )

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

d > 0
In sum, A13 (x) > 0. Then,
' x+

A11 (x, )

1
2
f
  1
1
  
1
(  x + )2

(x)2  2 (x) ( + ) 42 + 4

> 0
and thus ' x+

A11 (x, ) d
dx
A12 (x, ) d > 0
Combine with
% x+
 A
12 (x, ) d
dxA
11 (x, ) d > 0 and A (x, x + ) > 0, it is proved
that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0. That is, u(x, Ix) is increasing when    < x <    <  + .
B.7 Proof of Lemma 3.2
This section shows that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0 for    < x <  + .
Since
   <     x <  + 
it can be shown that
x   <       x + 
and then the integration bounds are
 (x) = 
 (x) = 
137
the productivity ratio is

x
)x (Ix , )

1
= Ra1 (x, Ix , )
and the probability of staying and the ex ante probability of staying are
Pstay (Ix , ) = P 1stay (Ix , )
P estay (Ix) = P
e1
stay (Ix)
Thus, the expression (B.8) can be simpliKed as
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
' 

d
dx
A (x, ) d
where
A (x, ) = 1
  
Ra1 (x, Ix , )

f
  1

P e1stay (Ix)
P 1stay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
P 1stay (Ix , )
+ f

=
1
  
(x)
1
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


f
  1

++22x
4

2 +
x
2
 1

+
fe

2 +
x
2
+ f

=
1
  
(x)
1
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


f
  1

 +   2
2 ( +  x)

+
2fe
( +  x) + f

DeKne
A21 (x, ) = (x)
1  ( +  x
)
( + )
  (x)
 > 0
A22 (x, ) =

f
  1

 +   2
2 ( +  x)

+
2fe
( +  x) + f

=  (Ix , ) > 0
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and then
d
dx
A (x, ) = 1
  

A22 (x, ) d
dx
A21 (x, ) + A21 (x, ) d
dx
A22 (x, )

(B.13)
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
' 

d
dx
A (x, ) d (B.14)
=
1
  
' 


A22 (x, ) d
dx
A21 (x, )

d +
' 


A21 (x, ) d
dx
A22 (x, )

d

Step 1. Show that
% 


A22 (x, ) d
dxA
21 (x, )

d > 0.
d
dx
A21 (x, )
=
d
dx

(x)
1
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


=
 (x)
2
(( + )
  (x)
)2

(x)
 ( + ) (x) ( + )
 + (  1) ( + )
+1

=
 (x)
2
(( + )
  (x)
)2
( + )
+1

x
 + 


  x

 +  + (  1)

DeKne
F 21 (m) = m
  m+ (  1)
where
m =
x
 +  <
 + 
 +  < 1
and get
d
dm
F 21 (m) = 

m
1  1

< 0
then
F 21 (m) > F 21 (1) = 0 (B.15)
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Thus,
d
dx
A21 (x, ) > 0 (B.16)
' 


A22 (x, ) d
dx
A21 (x, )

d > 0 (B.17)
Step 2. Show that
% 


A21 (x, ) d
dxA
22 (x, )

d > 0.
d
dx
A22 (x, )
=
d
dx

f
  1

 +   2
2 ( +  x)

+
2fe
( +  x) + f

=
f
  1
 +   2
2 ( +  x)2
+
2fe
( +  x)2
then
' 

A21 (x, ) d
dx
A22 (x, ) d
=
' 

A21 (x, )

f
  1
 +   2
2 ( +  x)2
+
2fe
( +  x)2

d
=
' 

A21 (x, ) f  1
 +   2
2 ( +  x)2
d +
' 

A21 (x, ) 2fe
( +  x)2
d
the second term is positive since A21 (x, ) > 0, and now it is needed to show that
% 
 A
21 (x, ) +2
2(+x)2d  0. Note that
A21 (x, )  +   2
2 ( +  x)2
= (x)
1
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)

 +   2
2 ( +  x)2
= (x)
1

( + )
  (x)

1
2 ( +  x)

 +   2

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DeKne
F 22 (x, ) = (x)
1 
( + )
  (x)

1
2 ( +  x) = (x
)
1

2
F 12 (x, ) > 0
and since
d
dF
12 (x, ) < 0
it is easy to see that
d
dF
22 (x, ) < 0
For  <  < +
2
,
F 22 (x, ) > F 22

x,
 + 
2

F 22 (x, )

 +   2

> F 22

x,
 + 
2

 +   2

and for +
2
<  < ,
F 22 (x, ) < F 22

x,
 + 
2

F 22 (x, )

 +   2

> F 22

x,
 + 
2

 +   2

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then
' 

A21 (x, )  +   2
2 ( +  x)2
d
=
' 

F 22 (x, )

 +   2

d
=
' +
2

F 22 (x, )

 +   2

d +
' 
+
2
F 22 (x, )

 +   2

d
>
' +
2

F 22

x,
 + 
2

 +   2

d +
' 
+
2
F 22

x,
 + 
2

 +   2

d
= F 22

x,
 + 
2
' 


 +   2

d
= 0
and thus ' 

A21 (x, ) d
dx
A22 (x, ) d > 0
Combine with
% 
 A
22 (x, ) d
dxA
21 (x, ) d > 0, it is proved that d
dxu(x
, Ix) > 0.
That is, u(x, Ix) is increasing when    < x <  + .
B.8 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Since u(x, Ix) is continuous and strictly increasing, once it can be shown that u(x, Ix) < 0
when x =    and limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0, then the solution x to u(x, Ix) = 0 exists
and is unique. Now consider u(x, Ix) when x =   . By (3.17),
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u(x, Ix)|xi=
=  (  , I, )
= Ra (  , I, ) ( (I, ) + f) f
= (  )
1 2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1

Estay (I)
Pstay (I, )
 1

+
fe
Pstay (I, )
+ f

 f
= (0)
1
2
( + )
  (0)
 (fe + f) f
= f < 0
Furthermore, with assumption 3.3 that limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0, lemma 3.5 can be obtained.
B.9 Proof of Lemma 3.6
B.9.1 x is in Region 1
Here exhibit the analysis when x is in region 1, and x is in region 1 as well.
First consider the case when x =    (= 0). By (3.17),
u(x, Ix)|x= =  (  , Ix , ) =

  
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) f = f < 0
Note that u(x, Ix)|x= = f < 0 holds no matter the relative precision of public and
private information or the value of switching point x.
Now consider the case when   < x < x <   < + . That is, when x is region
1, and x is also in region 1. (3.35) can be written as
u(x, Ix) =
1
x+  
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
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and by assumption 3.1,
u(x, Ix) =
' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
On the other hand, when x = x,
u(x, Ix) =
' x+

(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d  f (B.18)
thus
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)
=
' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

' x+

(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

' x+
x+
(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
=
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

' x+
x+
(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
Since x < x and

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) =

1
)x (Ix , )

1
1
 r ()x (Ix , ) , Ix , ) > 0
It can be shown that
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d < 0
' x+
x+
(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
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As a result,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) < 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) < u(x
, Ix) = 0
B.9.2 x is in Region 2
Now consider the cases when x is in region 2 or region 4. When x is in region 2, depending
on whether x is in region 1 or 2, the expression of u(x, Ix) is diRerent. Then, the proof is
derived based on the regions of x. And when x is in region 4, the proof is exactly the same
as the case when x is in region 1 and x < x.
x is in Region 1 Show that when  > 2, if    < x <     x <  + , then
u(x, Ix) < 0.
From (3.35),
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
1
x+  
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
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and
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
1
  
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

+
1
  
' 
x+

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
 1
x
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

+
1
  
' 
x+

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
The inequality holds since
0 <    =     x
Then,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)

' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
 1
  
' 
x+

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

Since x < x and


1
x(Ix ,)

1
( (Ix , ) + f) > 0,
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d < 0
1
  
' 
x+

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

> 0
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and thus,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) < 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) < u(x
, Ix) = 0
x is in Region 2 Show that for     x < x <  + , u(x, Ix) < 0. From (3.35),
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
and then
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)
=
1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

=
1
  
' 


x
1  (x)
1
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

Since x < x and


1
x(Ix ,)

1
( (Ix , ) + f) > 0,
1
  
' 


x
1  (x)
1
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

< 0
and thus,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) < 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) < u(x
, Ix) = 0
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B.10 Proof of Lemma 3.7
This section shows that when x is in region 1, 2 or 4, for x > x, u(x, Ix) > 0. When
x is in region 1, x can fall in region 1, 2 or 3. When x is in region 2, x can fall in region
2 or 3. When x is in region 4, x can fall in region 4, 5 or 6. The proof is done for diRerent
cases separately.
B.10.1 x is in Region 1
When x is in region 1, depending on the value of x, the expression of u(x, Ix) is diRerent.
Consider the cases when x is in region 1, 2 or 3, separately. The proof of u(x, Ix) > 0 when
x =  +  will be included in the part when x is in region 3.
x is in Region 1 First show that if    < x < x <    <  + , then u(x, Ix) > 0.
(Both x and x are in region 1.) From (3.35),
u(x, Ix) =
1
x+  

" 
% x+
 Ra
1 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
% x+
x+Ra
2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d

#! f
=
1
x+  
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
x+  
' x+
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
and by assumption 3.1,
u(x, Ix) =
' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
x+  
' x+
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
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From (B.18),
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)
=
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
x+  
' x+
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
Since x > x and


1
x(Ix ,)

1
( (Ix , ) + f) > 0, Ra2 (x, Ix , ) > 0,
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
1
x+  
' x+
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
and then,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) > 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) > u(x
, Ix) = 0
x is in Region 2 Second, show that if  < x <   x < +, then u(x, Ix) > 0.
(x is in region 1 and x in region 2.) From (3.35),
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u(x, Ix) =
1
  

" 
% x+
 Ra
1 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
% 
x+Ra
2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d

#! f
=
1
  
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
 1
x
' x+


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
=
' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d  f
The inequality comes from the fact that
0 <    =     x
From (B.18),
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)

' x+

x
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d

' x+

(x)
2

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
=
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d
+
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d
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Since x > x and


1
x(Ix ,)

1
( (Ix , ) + f) > 0, Ra2 (x, Ix , ) > 0,
' x+


x
2  (x)
2
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
1
  
' 
x+
Ra2 (x, Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f) d > 0
and then,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) > 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) > u(x
, Ix) = 0
x is in Region 3 Lastly, show that if    < x <    <  +   x   + , then
u(x, Ix) > 0. (x is in region 1 and x in region 3.) It is Krst shown that u(x, Ix) is a
continuous function with continuous Krst order derivative and the end points of u(x, Ix) in
interval

 + ,  + 

are positive. Then, to show u(x, Ix) > 0 for +   x  +  can be
simpliKed as to show the local extrema is (are) positive. Write the expected payoR for Krm
with productivity level x. For  +   x <  + ,
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
where
g (Ix , ) =

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f)
=



g1 (Ix , ) when   x + 
g2 (Ix , ) when  > x + 
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Here
g1 (Ix , ) =
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


f
  1

P estay (Ix)

2 +
x
2
 1

+
fe

2 +
x
2
+ f

=
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1Estay (Ix
) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1

P estay (Ix)
1
 1

+
fe
1
+ f

=
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

If x < x + 2,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
  (x )
' x+
x
g1 (Ix , ) d +
' 
x+
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d +
x
1
  (x )
d
dx
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d

=
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g1 (Ix , x )
If x  x + 2,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d +
x
1
  (x )
d
dx
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d

=
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g2 (Ix , x )
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for x > x + 2. Since
lim
xx+2
d
dx
u(x, Ix) = lim
xx+2+
d
dx
u(x, Ix)
and u(x, Ix) is continuous, ddxu(x, Ix) is continuous at point x = x
 + 2. Summarize
d
dx
u(x, Ix) in the following expression
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g (Ix , x )
Now, consider
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) = lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
Consider g (Ix , ) when  

x , 

now. Since P estay (Ix) is a decreasing function with
x, and x <   ,
P estay (Ix) > P
e
stay (Ix) |x= =
 +  + 2 2

  

4 =
5 
4
then,
g1 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 2
 + 



f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1
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and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
f
  1

>
2
 + 



f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

That is,
g (Ix , ) > g
where g is a constant and is deKned as
g =
2
 + 



f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

By assumption 3.4, g > 0. And then,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix)  lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g d  f
= lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
g

  (x )

 f
= g

 + 

1  f
where
g

 + 

1  f
=

 + 

1 2
 + 



f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 f
=
2
 + 


f
  1
5 
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 f
>




f

1
5
4 + 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f > 0
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by assumption 3.4. That is,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
Moreover, by left continuous of u(x, Ix) at point x =  + ,
u(x, Ix)|x=+ = lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
From the deKnition of limitation, for  > 0, there exists a  > 0, such that for all x that
satisfy

 + 

 x < , the inequality |u(x, Ix) 0| <  holds. That is, a x can be found
such that u(x, Ix) > 0 for x  [x, + ). That is, u(x, Ix) > 0. Moreover, since u(x, Ix)
is continuous and limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0, u( + , Ix) > 0. Then, to show u(x, Ix) > 0
when x belongs to region 1 and x belongs to region 3 can be simpliKed as to show that all
local extrema is (are) positive. Suppose x1 satisKes the Krst order condition
d
dx
u(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d =
x11
(x1)
g (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)

And then
u(x1, Ix) =
x
11
  (x1  )
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d  f
=


x11
(x1)
2
g (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)
  f
=
x
1g (Ix , x1  )
 + 

(  1) + x1 (2 )
 f
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Consider x
1g (Ix , x1  ) now.
x
1g
1 (Ix , x1  )
= x
1
2
x
1  (x)



f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  x1)
2
f
  1

> 2

f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  x1)
2
f
  1

and
x
1g
2 (Ix , x1  )
= x
1
2
x
1  (x1  2)



f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

> 2

f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

Since  +  < x1 <  + ,
x  x1 > x1 > 

 + 


 + 

(  1) + x1 (2 ) <

 + 

(  1) + ( + ) (2 )
As a result, when x < x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >




f

1
5
4 + 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f > 0
and when x  x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >




f

1
5
4 + 2fe  2
f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f
>




f

1
5
4 + 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f > 0
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by assumption 3.4. In sum, u(x1, Ix) > 0 for ddxu(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0 and thus u(x, Ix) >
0 when x belongs to region 1, x belongs to region 3. Combined with the fact that
u(x, Ix)|x=+ > 0, the result is u(x, Ix) > 0 for  +   x   + .
B.10.2 x is in Region 2
x is in Region 2 Show that when     x < x <  + , u(x, Ix) > 0. From (3.35),
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
and then
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix)
=
1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 1
  
' 


x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

=
1
  
' 


x
1  (x)
1
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

Since x > x and


1
x(Ix ,)

1
( (Ix , ) + f) > 0,
1
  
' 


x
1  (x)
1
 1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

> 0
and thus,
u(x, Ix) u(x, Ix) > 0
That is,
u(x, Ix) > u(x
, Ix) = 0
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x is in Region 3 When    <     x <  + , and  +   x <  + ,
x <  +  =

  

+ 2  x + 2
then,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
  (x )
' x+
x
g1 (Ix , ) d +
' 
x+
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g1 (Ix , x )
Now, consider
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) = lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
Consider g (Ix , ) when  

x , 

now. Since P estay (Ix) is a decreasing function
with x, and x <  + ,
P estay (Ix) > P
e
stay (Ix) |x=+ =
 +  + 2 2 ( + )
4 =
  
4
then,
g1 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 2
 + 



f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1
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and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  
4 + fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 2
 + 



f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

That is,
g (Ix , ) > g
where g is a constant and is deKned as
g =
2
 + 



f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

By assumption 3.4, g > 0. And then,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix)  lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
gd  f
= lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
g

  (x )

 f
= g

 + 

1  f
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where
g

 + 

1  f
=

 + 

1 2
 + 



f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 f
=
2
 + 


f
  1
  
4 + fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 f
>




f

1

4 + 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f > 0
by assumption 3.4. That is,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
Moreover, by left continuous of u(x, Ix) at point x =  + ,
u(x, Ix)|x=+ = lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
From the deKnition of limitation, for  > 0, there exists a  > 0, such that for all x that
satisfy

 + 

 x < , the inequality |u(x, Ix) 0| <  holds. That is, a x can be found
such that u(x, Ix) > 0 for x  [x, + ). That is, u(x, Ix) > 0. Moreover, since u(x, Ix)
is continuous and limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0, u( + , Ix) > 0. Then, to show u(x, Ix) > 0
when x belongs to region 2 and x belongs to region 3 can be simpliKed as to show that all
local extrema is(are) positive. Suppose x1 satisKe(s) the Krst order condition
d
dx
u(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d =
x11
(x1)
g1 (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)
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And then
u(x1, Ix) =
x
11
  (x1  )
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d  f
=


x11
(x1)
2
g1 (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)
  f
=
x
1g
1 (Ix , x1  )
 + 

(  1) + x1 (2 )
 f
Consider x
1g
1 (Ix , x1  ) now.
x
1g
1 (Ix , x1  )
= x
1
2
x
1  (x)



f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  x1)
2
f
  1

> 2

f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  x1)
2
f
  1

Since  +  < x1 <  + ,
x  x1 > x1 > 

 + 


 + 

(  1) + x1 (2 ) <

 + 

(  1) + ( + ) (2 )
As a result,
u(x1, Ix) >




f

1

2
+ 2fe 

 + 

f

1


 + 

(  1) + 2 (2 )
 f > 0
by assumption 3.4. In sum, u(x1, Ix) > 0 for ddxu(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0 and thus u(x, Ix) > 0
when x belongs to region 2, x belongs to region 3. Combine with the fact that u(x, Ix)|x=+ >
0, the result is u(x, Ix) > 0 for  +   x   + .
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B.10.3 x is in Region 4
x is in Region 4 The proof of this case is the same as the case when x belongs to region
1 and x belongs to region 4.
x is in Region 5 When    < x <  +     , and  +   x <   ,
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)
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where
g (Ix , ) =
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If x < x + 2,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
2
' x+
x
g1 (Ix , ) d +
' x+
x+
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
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d
dx
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d
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If x  x + 2,
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dx
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x
1
2
d
dx
' x+
x
g2 (Ix , ) d

=
d
dx

x
1
2
' x+
x
g2 (Ix , ) d +
x
1
2

g2 (Ix , x+ ) g2 (Ix , x )

for x > x + 2. Since
lim
xx+2
d
dx
u(x, Ix) = lim
xx+2+
d
dx
u(x, Ix)
and u(x, Ix) is continuous, ddxu(x, Ix) is continuous at point x = x
 + 2. Summarize
d
dx
u(x, Ix) in the following expression
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
2
' x+
x
g (Ix , ) d +
x
1
2 (g (Ix
 , x+ ) g (Ix , x ))
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Now, consider
lim
x
u(x, Ix) = lim
x
x
1
2
' x+
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
Consider g (Ix , ) when   [x , x+ ] now. Since P estay (Ix) is a decreasing function
with x, and x <  + ,
P estay (Ix) > P
e
stay (Ix) |x=+ =
1
  

  x  ( +  x
)2
4

|x=+ =   2  
then,
g1 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

Then,
lim
x
u(x, Ix) = lim
x
x
1
2
' x+
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
 lim
x
x
1
2
' x+
x
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

d  f
=

  

1 ' 
2

( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

d  f
> 0
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by assumption 3.4. That is,
lim
x
u(x, Ix) > 0
Moreover, by left continuous of u(x, Ix) at point x =   ,
u(x, Ix)|x= = lim
x
u(x, Ix) > 0
From the deKnition of limitation, for  > 0, there exists a  > 0, such that for all x that
satisfy

  

 x < , the inequality |u(x, Ix) 0| <  holds. That is, a x can be found
such that u(x, Ix) > 0 for x  [x,  ). That is, u(x, Ix) > 0. Moreover, since u(x, Ix)
is continuous and limx+ u(x, Ix) > 0, u( + , Ix) > 0. Then, to show u(x, Ix) > 0
when x belongs to region 4 and x belongs to region 5 can be simpliKed as to show that all
local extrema is(are) positive. Suppose x1 satisKe(s) the Krst order condition
d
dx
u(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0
' x1+
x1
g (Ix , ) d =
x11
2 (g (Ix , x1  ) g (Ix , x1 + ))
d
dx1


x11
2

And then
u(x1, Ix) =
x
11
2
' x1+
x1
g (Ix , ) d  f
=


x11
2
2
(g (Ix , x1  ) g (Ix , x1 + ))
d
dx1


x11
2
  f
=
x
1 (g (Ix , x1  ) g (Ix , x1 + ))
2 (  1)  f
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Consider x
1 (g (Ix , x1  ) g (Ix , x1 + )) now. Since  +  < x1 <   ,
x
1

g1 (Ix , x1  ) g2 (Ix , x1 + )

= x
1


2

(x1)
(x)



f

1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x(x1))
2
f

1

 2

(x1+2)(x1)
 
f

1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe  f
1



> 2

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
( + 3)
2
f
  1

 2

1 + 2
x1


 1

f
  1 + fe 
f
  1

 2

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
( + 3)
2
f
  1

 2

1 + 2+3


 1
(f + fe)
and
x
1

g2 (Ix , x1  ) g2 (Ix , x1 + )

= x
1


2

(x1)
(x12)
 
f

1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe  f
1

 2

(x1+2)(x1)
 
f

1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe  f
1



> x
1

2
(x1)

  (x1  2)

 2
(x1 + 2)
  (x1)


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

>

 2  2

1 + 2


 1

!

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

As a result, when x < x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >

(  1)

" 



f

1
2
 + fe 
(+3)
2
f

1

 1
(1+ 2+3)
1
(f + fe)

#! f > 0
and when x  x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >

(  1)

 

 1 1

1 + 2


 1

!

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

! f > 0
by assumption 3.4.
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In sum, u(x1, Ix) > 0 for ddxu(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0 and thus u(x, Ix) > 0 when x belongs
to region 4, x belongs to region 5.
x is in Region 6 When    < x +     , and     x <  + ,
u(x, Ix) =
1
 (x)  (x)
' (x)
(x)

x
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f) d

 f
=
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
where
g (Ix , ) =

1
)x (Ix , )

1
( (Ix , ) + f)
=



g1 (Ix , ) when   x + 
g2 (Ix , ) when  > x + 
Here
g1 (Ix , ) =
 ( +  x)
( + )
  (x)


f
  1

P estay (Ix)

2 +
x
2
 1

+
fe

2 +
x
2
+ f

=
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1

P estay (Ix)
1
 1

+
fe
1
+ f

=
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1
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If x < x + 2,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
  (x )
' x+
x
g1 (Ix , ) d +
' 
x+
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d +
x
1
  (x )
d
dx
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d

=
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g1 (Ix , x )
If x  x + 2,
u(x, Ix) =
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d

 f
and
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d +
x
1
  (x )
d
dx
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d

=
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g2 (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g2 (Ix , x )
for x > x + 2. Since
lim
xx+2
d
dx
u(x, Ix) = lim
xx+2+
d
dx
u(x, Ix)
and u(x, Ix) is continuous, ddxu(x, Ix) is continuous at point x = x
 + 2. Summarize
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d
dx
u(x, Ix) in the following expression
d
dx
u(x, Ix) =
d
dx

x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d 
x
1
  (x )
g (Ix , x )
Now, consider
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) = lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
g (Ix , ) d  f
Consider g (Ix , ) when  

x , 

now. Since P estay (Ix) is a decreasing function
with x, and x <  + ,
P estay (Ix) > P
e
stay (Ix) |x=+ =
1
  

  x  ( +  x
)2
4

|x=+ =   2  
then,
g1 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (x)


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  ( + ))
2
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 
2
f
  1

 2
( + 3)


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 3
2
f
  1

and
g2 (Ix , ) =
2
( + )
  (  )


f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

>
2
( + )


f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

>
2
 + 



f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1

That is,
g (Ix , ) > g
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where g is a constant and is deKned as
g = min



2

(+3)



f

1
2
 + fe 
+3
2
f

1

,
2

(+)




f

1
2
 + fe 
f

1




By assumption 3.4, g > 0. And then,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix)  lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
' 
x
gd  f
= lim
x+
x
1
  (x )
g

  (x )

 f
= g

 + 

1  f > 0
by assumption 3.4. That is,
lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
Moreover, by left continuous of u(x, Ix) at point x =  + ,
u(x, Ix)|x=+ = lim
x+
u(x, Ix) > 0
From the deKnition of limitation, for  > 0, there exists a  > 0, such that for all x that
satisfy

 + 

 x < , the inequality |u(x, Ix) 0| <  holds. That is, a x can be found
such that u(x, Ix) > 0 for x  [x, + ). That is, u(x, Ix) > 0. In addition, as showed in
the above part, u( , Ix) > 0. Then, to show u(x, Ix) > 0 when x belongs to region 4
and x belongs to region 6 can be simpliKed as to show that all local extrema is(are) positive.
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Suppose x1 satisKe(s) the Krst order condition
d
dx
u(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d =
x11
(x1)
g (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)

And then
u(x1, Ix) =
x
11
  (x1  )
' 
x1
g (Ix , ) d  f
=


x11
(x1)
2
g (Ix , x1  )
d
dx1


x11
(x1)
  f
=
x
1g (Ix , x1  )
 + 

(  1) + x1 (2 )
 f
Consider x
1g (Ix , x1  ) now.
x
1g
1 (Ix , x1  )
= x
1
2
x
1  (x)



f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe +
(x  x1)
2
f
  1

> 2

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
 + 3
2
f
  1

and
x
1g
2 (Ix , x1  )
= x
1
2
x
1  (x1  2)



f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1

> 2

f
  1
  2
  
+ fe 
f
  1
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As a result, when x < x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >
2



f

1
2
 + fe 
+3
2
f

1


 + 

(  1) +

  

(2 )
 f > 0
and when x  x + 2,
u(x1, Ix) >
2



f

1
2
 + fe 
f

1


 + 

(  1) +

  

(2 )
 f
>
2



f

1
2
 + fe 
+3
2
f

1


 + 

(  1) +

  

(2 )
 f > 0
by assumption 3.4. In sum, u(x1, Ix) > 0 for ddxu(x, Ix)|x=x1 = 0 and thus u(x, Ix) > 0
when x belongs to region 4, x belongs to region 6. Combine with the fact that u(x, Ix)|x=+ >
0, the result is that u(x, Ix) > 0 for  +   x   + . This completes the proof.
B.11 Equilibrium Values
B.11.1 The Aggregate Revenue
R (Ix , )
= M (Ix , ) r (Ix , )
= M (Ix , ) ( (Ix , ) + f)
= Me (Ix)Pstay (Ix , )

f
  1

P estay (Ix)
Pstay (Ix , )
 1

+
fe
Pstay (Ix , )
+ f

= Me (Ix)

f
  1P
e
stay (Ix) + fe 
f
  1Pstay (Ix
 , )
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B.11.2 The Expected Aggregate Revenue
R (Ix) = E [R (Ix , )]
= E [LMe (Ix) fe +M (Ix , )  ()x) (Ix , )]
= LMe (Ix) fe +Me (Ix)E [Pstay (Ix , )  ()x) (Ix , )]
= L
where the last equality comes from the free entry condition.
B.12 Comparative Statics for Melitz Model
This part discusses the comparative statics for Melitz case when the precision of private
information changes. Following the game with incomplete information, there are three stages
for Melitz case. In the Krst stage, Krm pays Kxed entry costs fe to enter the market with
a common knowledge of the mean productivity . In the second stage, Krm knows its own
productivity x and decides whether to stay in the market or not. Firm pays Kxed costs f
if it chooses to stay. In the last stage, existing Krm pays variable costs q
x
, sets price p, and
sells outputs in the market. The equilibrium cutoR productivity level x can be obtained
through the following two conditions: zero cutoR proKt condition and free entry condition.
Only key steps are shown here, and the detailed derivations can be found in Melitz (2003).
B.12.1 Zero CutoC ProAt Condition
x is the cutoR productivity level, and in the second stage the proKt for Krm with productivity
level x is
 (x) = 1 r (x
) f = 0
 r (x) = f
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Then, the average proKt is
 =  ()x (x)) = 1 r ()x (x
)) f = 1
)x (x)
x

1
r (x) f =
)x (x)
x

1
 1

f
(B.19)
where
)x (x) =
' +
x
1
 +  x (x)

1 dx
 1
1
=

1

1
 +  x (( + )

  (x)
)
 1
1
Note it is assumed that     x <  + .
B.12.2 Free Entry Condition
The net value ve of entry is zero.
ve = Pstay  fe = 0
  = fe
Pstay
=
2fe
 +  x (B.20)
As a result, in equilibrium,
)x (x)
x

1
 1

f =
2fe
 +  x
B.12.3 Equilibrium Variables
With equilibrium cutoR productivity level x, equilibrium value of other variables can be
found as following.
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• Mass of successful entrants M = PstayMe
By (B.20),
Le =Mefe =
M
Pstay
fe =M = 
then,
R = Lp +  = Lp + Le = L
 M = R
r ()x (x)) =
L
 ( ()x (x)) + f)
• Mass of entrants Me
Me =
M
Pstay
• Total revenue R =Mr ()x (x))
R = L
• Aggregate price P
P =M
1
1 p ()x (x)) =M 11 1)x (x)
• Aggregate quantity Q( U)
Q =
R
P
=
L)x (x)
M
1
1
• Welfare per worker
W =
U
L
=
Q
L
=
R
P
1
L
=
1
P
B.12.4 How Changes in  ACect the CutoC Point x
The cutoR productivity level x is such that
)x (x)
x

1
 1

f  2fe +  x = 0
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DeKne
F (x, )
=
)x (x)
x

1
 1

f  2fe +  x
=

1

1
 +  x (( + )

  (x)
)

1
x

1
 1

f  2fe +  x
Then,
x
 = 
F (x, ) /
F (x, ) /x
Consider F (x
,)
 Krst.
F (x, )

=
f


1
x

1
1
(  x + )2

x
  x ( + )
1 + (  1) ( + )


+ 2fe
x  
(  x + )2
=
1
(  x + )2

f


1
x

1 
x
  x ( + )
1 + (  1) ( + )


+ 2fe (x
  )

DeKne
F 1 (x, ) = f

1
x

1 
x
  x ( + )
1 + (  1) ( + )


+ 2fe (x
  )
When F 1 (x, ) > 0, F (x
,)
 > 0 and when F
1 (x, ) < 0, F (x
,)
 < 0. Note that
x
  x ( + )
1 + (  1) ( + )
 > 0
and then if (x  )  0, F (x
,)
 > 0 for sure.
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Consider F (x
,)
x now.
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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)

1
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1
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1 
x

f
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 +  x (( + )

  (x)
)

+

f

1
 +  x (( + )

  (x)
)


x

1
x

1
 x

2fe
 +  x

= 

1
x

1
f

1
(  x + )2

x
  x ( + )
1 + (  1) ( + )




f

1
 +  x (( + )

  (x)
)

(  1)

1
x


 2 fe
(  x + )2
< 0
As a result, when F 1 (x, ) > 0, x > 0 and when F
1 (x, ) < 0, x < 0. For the
exercise in change of precision of private information for Melitz case, F 1 (x, ) > 0, and
then x

 > 0. That is, the cutoR productivity level decreases when the precision of private
information increases ( decreases).
B.12.5 The Welfare Ratio When the Precision of Private Information Changes
W (1)
W (2)
=
P (2)
P (1)
=
M (2)
1
1 )x (x (1))
M (1)
1
1 )x (x (2))
=


L

((x(x(2)))+f)
 1
1 )x (x (1))


L

((x(x(1)))+f)
 1
1 )x (x (2))
=
)x (x (1)) ( ()x (x (1))) + f)
1
1
)x (x (2)) ( ()x (x (2))) + f)
1
1
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Since
)x (x (1)) ( ()x (x (1))) + f)
1
1
= )x (x (1))
)x (x (1))
x (1)

1
 1

f + f
 1
1
= )x (x (1))
)x (x (1))
x (1)
1
= x (1)
then,
W (1)
W (2)
=
x (1)
x (1)
That is, the ratio between welfare per worker when the precision of private information
changes equals the ratio between the respective cutoR productivity levels. In other words,
when the cutoR productivity level increases, the welfare per worker increases. Note that this
equalization of ratios between welfare and ratios between cutoR productivities holds for any
distribution of productivities. In chapter 4, one can see that the standardized welfare curve
and the standardized cutoR productivity curve coincides with each other for the Melitz case
when the precision of private information changes.
178
  
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Aguiar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath. "Fire-sale foreign direct investment and 
liquidity crises." Review of Economics and Statistics 87.3 (2005): 439-452. 
Athey, Susan. "Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy 
equilibria in games of incomplete information." Econometrica 69.4 (2001): 861-
889. 
Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler. "Agency costs, net worth, and business 
fluctuations." The American Economic Review (1989): 14-31. 
Bhattacharya, Joydeep, and Rajesh Singh. "Optimal choice of monetary policy 
instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks." Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 32.4 (2008): 1273-1311. 
Bianchi, Javier, and Enrique G. Mendoza. Optimal Time-Consistent 
Macroprudential Policy. No. w19704. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2013. 
Bordo, Michael D., and Olivier Jeanne. Boom-busts in asset prices, economic 
instability, and monetary policy. No. w8966. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2002. 
Bulow, Jeremy I., John D. Geanakoplos, and Paul D. Klemperer. "Multimarket 
oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements." Journal of Political economy 
93.3 (1985): 488-511. 
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy. International liquidity 
management: sterilization policy in illiquid financial markets. No. w7740. 
National bureau of economic research, 2000. 
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy. "International and domestic 
collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises." Journal of 
monetary Economics 48.3 (2001): 513-548. 
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy. A dual liquidity model for 
emerging markets. No. w8758. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002. 
Claessens, Stijn, et al. "Cross-country experiences and policy implications from 
the global financial crisis." Economic Policy 25.62 (2010): 267-293. 
179
Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, 
and liquidity." The journal of political economy (1983): 401-419. 
Dixit, Avinash K., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Monopolistic competition and 
optimum product diversity." The American Economic Review 67.3 (1977): 297-
308. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. "Private and public supply of liquidity." 
Journal of Political Economy 106.1 (1998): 1-40. 
Jeanne, Olivier, and Anton Korinek. Managing credit booms and busts: A 
Pigouvian taxation approach. No. w16377. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010. 
Karp, Larry, In Ho Lee, and Robin Mason. "A global game with strategic 
substitutes and complements." Games and Economic Behavior 60.1 (2007): 155-
175. 
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore. "Credit Cycles." The Journal of Political 
Economy 105.2 (1997): 211-248. 
Krugman, Paul R. "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and 
international trade." Journal of international Economics 9.4 (1979): 469-479. 
Krugman, Paul. "History versus expectations." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1991): 651-667. 
Krugman, Paul. "Fire-sale FDI." Capital flows and the emerging economies: 
theory, evidence, and controversies. University of Chicago Press, 2000. 43-58. 
Lorenzoni, Guido. "Inefficient credit booms." The Review of Economic Studies 
75.3 (2008): 809-833. 
Melitz, Marc J. "The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and 
aggregate industry productivity." Econometrica 71.6 (2003): 1695-1725. 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. "Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium 
in games with strategic complementarities." Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society (1990): 1255-1277. 
Milgrom, Paul, and Chris Shannon. "Monotone comparative statics." 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1994): 157-180. 
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. "Unique equilibrium in a model of 
self-fulfilling currency attacks." American Economic Review (1998): 587-597. 
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. "Global games: theory and applications." 
(2001). 
Nadiri, M. Ishaq, and Ingmar R. Prucha. "Estimation of the depreciation rate 
of physical and R&D capital in the US total manufacturing sector." Economic 
Inquiry 34.1 (1996): 43-56. 
180
Pulvino, Todd C. "Do asset fire sales exist? An empirical investigation of 
commercial aircraft transactions." The Journal of Finance 53.3 (1998): 939-978. 
RanciËre, Romain, and Aaron Tornll. "Systemic Risk-Taking and the U.S. 
Financial Crisis." (2009) 
Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor. Credit booms gone bust: monetary 
policy, leverage cycles and financial crises, 1870--2008. No. w15512. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Liquidation values and debt capacity: 
A market equilibrium approach." The Journal of Finance 47.4 (1992): 1343-
1366. 
Vives, Xavier. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities." Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 19.3 (1990): 305-321. 
 
181
